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CONFRONTING THE “ONGOING EMERGENCY”: 
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
ELLEN LIANG YEE∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 The Supreme Court’s pathbreaking decision in Crawford v. Wash-
ington1 held that admission of an extrajudicial testimonial statement 
by an unavailable declarant-witness violates the Confrontation 
Clause unless the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant. Unfortunately, the determination of admissibility for the 
trial court judge has not been simplified after Crawford. The role of 
the trial court judge has now shifted from determining the reliability 
of the hearsay evidence (as was required before Crawford) to a deter-
mination of the testimonial nature of the declarant’s statement. How-
ever, with some small exceptions, the Court in Crawford explicitly de-
cided that it would “leave for another day” a more specific definition 
of the term “testimonial,” which would have helped to clarify how to 
address admissibility issues in many cases.2 
 This testimonial thicket presents a difficult set of issues for lower 
court judges making admissibility determinations where there is a re-
lationship between an unavailable witness-declarant and a criminal 
defendant. The relationship between a criminal defendant and a wit-
ness-declarant is often nuanced and complex, making trial appear-
ance of the declarant problematic. For example, in cases where the de-
clarant-witness is a victim of domestic violence or child abuse, courts 
face some of the most difficult issues in determining which hearsay 
statements implicate the Confrontation Clause.  
 Davis v. Washington3 provided an opportunity for the Court to ad-
dress this issue in the context of two separately appealed domestic vio-
lence cases. To its credit, in Davis, the Court partially cleared the 
Crawford path by providing more guidance on the types of “police in-
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and Southwest University of Political Science and Law for their comments and questions. 
Particular thanks are owed to Chuck Ehrhardt, Mary Louise Fellows, Tahirih Lee, Jim 
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 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 68. 
 3. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
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terrogations” that may produce “testimonial” statements. However, the 
Court’s approach in Davis fails to provide a comprehensive set of con-
siderations for lower courts in addressing relationships that make it 
problematic for the witness-declarant to testify at trial. For example, 
the Court has provided incomplete guidance for determining when an 
“ongoing emergency” is present—an important predicate inquiry to an 
admissibility determination where there is a relationship between a 
witness-declarant and a criminal defendant. Drawing from and ex-
tending the Court’s approach in Davis, this Article suggests a method 
of analysis that implements the framework of Crawford within the 
broader institutional goals of the criminal justice system. Specifically, 
by providing an analytical approach to aid courts in defining an “on-
going emergency” in the context of problematic relationships, the Arti-
cle gives lower courts some much-needed guidance to assist in ad-
dressing the admissibility of statements by witness-declarants who 
may be unavailable to testify.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 According to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”4 Judicial interpreta-
tion of this clause critically impacts the admissibility of evidence in 
criminal trials. The Supreme Court only intermittently addressed 
confrontation issues until 1980, when the Court established a 
framework of analysis for admission of hearsay evidence based on a 
pretrial judicial determination of reliability in Ohio v. Roberts.5 
 In 2004, after nearly twenty-four years of this well-entrenched re-
liability approach, the Supreme Court substantially altered the 
course of Confrontation Clause analysis with its pathbreaking deci-
sion in Crawford v. Washington.6 In Crawford, the Court concluded 
that the Sixth Amendment barred “admission of testimonial state-
ments of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was un-
available to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.”7 Not surprisingly, following Crawford, lower 
courts struggled to develop predictable and principled rules to im-
plement this approach, and a number of leading scholars critically 
debated how the doctrine should apply.8 One particular problem is 
                                                                                                                     
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 5. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 6. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 7. Id. at 53-54. 
 8. The articles are too numerous to cite comprehensively, but a few representative 
examples include Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations 
Against Penal Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2409 (2005); R. Mi-
chael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339 
(2006); James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for “Forfei-
ture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193 (2006); Richard D. Friedman, The 
Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439; Randolph 
N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington, Noah Web-
ster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155 (2006); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Bat-
terers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005); Miguel A. Méndez, Crawford v. Washing-
ton: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569 (2004); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: 
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how exactly lower courts should determine what kinds of statements 
are “testimonial” within the new Confrontation Clause framework.9  
 Two years later, the Supreme Court offered a partial solution 
when it issued its opinion in Davis v. Washington.10 With Davis, the 
Court was no longer able to sustain its “luxury of indecision”11 and 
was forced into the difficult effort of beginning to actually spell out a 
definition of “testimonial.”12 Davis recognized that “[s]tatements are 
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation un-
der circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”13 In contrast, the Court reasoned “[statements] are tes-
timonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the inter-
rogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”14 The “primary purpose” test that the 
Court set forth in Davis can be useful in evaluating the testimonial 
nature of a communication between a declarant and the police. In 
making the pragmatic differentiation of a police officer’s multiple 
roles, the Court signaled that it would not paint with broad strokes 
that are overinclusive simply because a bright-line standard may be 
easier to implement.  
 While Davis’s overall conclusion that not all statements to the po-
lice are testimonial is unassailable, the Court’s application of its 
standards to the two cases it decided is far too narrow to give mean-
ingful guidance to lower courts. This Article argues that the Court 
misapplied the primary purpose test to some of the facts addressed in 
Davis and that a more comprehensive evaluation of the surrounding 
                                                                                                                     
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (2005); 
Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions After 
Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST. 24 (2005); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic 
Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006); see also Symposium, 
Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its 
Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2005); Foreword: Perspectives on Crawford v. Washington, 2 
INT’L COMMENT. EVIDENCE 1 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol2/iss1/art1. 
 9. Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 241, 241 (2005); see also John M. Spires, Note, Testimonial or Nontestimonial? The 
Admissibility of Forensic Evidence After Crawford v. Washington, 94 KY. L.J. 187, 188 
(2005-2006) (describing the failure to sufficiently define “testimonial” as “[t]he sticking 
point” in Crawford); Ariana J. Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the 
Analysis of Testimonial Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581, 582 
(2006) (highlighting that Crawford explicitly fails to define the term “testimonial”). 
 10. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). This decision reflects appeals of two state supreme court 
cases that were consolidated, argued in tandem, and addressed by the Supreme Court in a 
single opinion. See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 
844 (Wash. 2005). 
 11. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823. 
 12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 13. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 14. Id. 
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circumstances is necessary, especially in certain types of cases. The 
Court’s approach provides insufficient guidance to assist lower courts 
in determining which facts indicate the presence of an “ongoing 
emergency,” particularly in the context of domestic violence and in 
other scenarios where the scope of the emergency may be indetermi-
nate. This Article proposes a principled way for courts to take a more 
careful and holistic approach to determining whether “the circum-
stances objectively indicate that there is [an] . . . ongoing emer-
gency.”15 
 Part II begins with a brief description of the legal landscape that 
preceded Crawford to provide background context for that decision. 
Part II then discusses the abrupt turn the Crawford Court took in its 
approach to the Confrontation Clause by changing the focus of the 
Clause from functioning as a judicially-determined safeguard against 
unreliable evidence to operating as a procedural trial right. In Craw-
ford, the Court declared that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue 
. . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”16 Be-
cause police interrogation is one of “the modern practices with closest 
kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was di-
rected,” the Court held that statements made in police interrogations 
are testimonial.17 While application of the Court’s new approach ade-
quately resolved the issue presented in Crawford, the opinion left 
open many questions about how the doctrine would apply in future 
cases. The primary issue remains how courts will determine which 
hearsay statements are “testimonial” and therefore subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.  
 Part III addresses Davis v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
most recent decision on testimonial hearsay and the Confrontation 
Clause. The Crawford Court had “use[d] the term ‘interrogation’ in 
its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.”18 Refusing to 
select among the “various definitions of ‘interrogation,’ ”19 the Court 
left open how this term would be interpreted and applied in future 
cases. In Davis, the Court began to articulate a more comprehensive 
definition of “testimonial” by delineating more specifically which po-
lice interrogations invoke the protection of the Confrontation Clause.  
 Davis’s standard requires a determination of the primary purpose 
of the police interrogation by objectively evaluating whether the cir-
cumstances indicate that there is an “ongoing emergency.” In Davis,  
 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Id. 
 16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 53 n.4. 
 19. Id.  
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the Court gave short shrift in both cases to the determination of 
whether there was an ongoing emergency. On the facts of Davis, the 
Court found the declarant was facing a “bona fide physical threat”20 
because she was “apparently in immediate danger from Davis”21 until 
Davis left the scene.22 Yet on the facts of Hammon, a companion case 
that the Court referred to in the Davis opinion,23 the Court found no 
ongoing emergency even though the defendant was still present and 
the officers observed broken items in the home. The Court reached 
this conclusion based on the fact that the declarant told the police 
when they arrived that “things were fine”24 and the fact that the po-
lice did not hear any “arguments or crashing” or see anyone “throw 
or break anything.”25 The scope of the circumstances considered in 
both cases was too limited to provide a meaningful determination re-
garding the existence of an ongoing emergency. 
 Davis presented a unique opportunity for the Court to address 
Crawford’s impact in domestic violence cases.26 In cases where the 
declarant-witness is a victim of domestic violence or child abuse, 
courts face some of the most difficult issues in determining which 
hearsay statements implicate the Confrontation Clause.27 Given the 
particular interpersonal dynamics involved in these types of cases,28 
the declarant is often absent from the court proceedings.29 Yet the 
Court refused to address this problem to the extent it failed to com-
prehensively consider all of the relevant circumstances, presenting a 
variety of potential barriers to lower courts’ truth-finding function in 
these kinds of cases.  
 Part IV criticizes the Court’s underinclusive conceptualization of 
what constitutes an “ongoing emergency.” For cases involving wit-
nesses who have a relationship with others involved with the case, a 
more thoroughly examined and nuanced view of which situations 
constitute an ongoing emergency is necessary. Institutional and so-
ciological factors can help in identifying when these kinds of rela-
tionships are present and how the relationship impacts the circum-
                                                                                                                     
 20. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. 
 21. Id. at 831. 
 22. Id. at 828. 
 23. See infra Part III.A.2 (referencing lower court opinion in Hammon). 
 24. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (citing Joint Appendix at 14, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-
5705), 2005 WL 3617526  [hereinafter Hammon Appendix]). 
 25. Id. at 829 (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 25). 
 26. Id. at 832-33. 
 27. See Lininger, supra note 8; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children 
Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
311 (2005); Tuerkheimer, supra note 8; Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of Silence: The 
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 213 (2005).  
 28. See infra Part IV.A. 
 29. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 10. 
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stances of a police interrogation. In recognition that certain kinds of 
relationships will inevitably hinder declarants’ appearance at trial, 
this Part discusses how lower court judges might approach admissi-
bility determinations in light of the broader goals of the criminal jus-
tice system, including truth and fairness. In addition, this Part iden-
tifies the specific factors courts should consider when making the in-
ferential determination of whether the declarant’s statements were 
made during an ongoing emergency.  
II.   BACKGROUND 
 The two primary components of the Confrontation Clause raise 
equally complex issues of interpretation and application. First, who 
are “the witnesses against [the accused]”?30 Second, what does it 
mean to “enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with”31 those witnesses? 
In 1970, Justice Harlan wrote, “[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to 
us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little insight 
into [its] intended scope . . . .”32 Nevertheless, courts and scholars 
have continued to scour the historical record for some indication of 
the Clause’s intended meaning.33 While the concept of confrontation 
has been traced back to the Roman era34 and to early English juris-
prudence,35 comprehensive searches of early American historical 
documents reveal only rare mention of the right.36   
                                                                                                                     
 30.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 31. Id.  
 32. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 33. See, e.g., William H. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and 
Due Process—A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 
6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 532 (1974); Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the 
Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 
481, 483-84 (1994); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Al-
ternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995); Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: 
What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67 (1969); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“There is virtually 
no evidence of what the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.” (citing 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 n.8 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result))).  
 34. There are indications that a right of confrontation existed under Roman 
law. The Roman Governor Festus, discussing the proper treatment of his 
prisoner, Paul, stated: “It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any 
man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and 
has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges.” 
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988) (quoting Acts 25:16).  
 35. Id. at 1016 (“It has been argued that a form of the right of confrontation was rec-
ognized in England well before the right to jury trial.” (citing Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right 
of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 384-87 (1959))). 
 36. Jonakait, supra note 33, at 77 n.4 (“Congressional intent is virtually impossible to 
determine since ‘[t]he clause was debated for a mere five minutes before its adoption.’ ” (al-
teration in original) (quoting Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of 
the Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 332 n.181 (1981))).  
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 However, there is some evidence of the right in American juris-
prudence even before the Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791.37 
Several states had adopted declarations of rights that guaranteed a 
right of confrontation before the federal constitutional amendment.38 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the right of confronta-
tion—a common law right that had recognized exceptions—preceded 
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment.39 While the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation and application of the right of confrontation initially 
developed in piecemeal fashion, one significant characteristic has 
remained constant: beginning in 1895 with Mattox v. United States, 
the Court, in several landmark cases, has consistently held that the 
right is not absolute.40  
 As the Court was faced with these issues over the next century, it 
primarily interpreted the Confrontation Clause as functioning to en-
sure the reliability of evidence. While maintaining a preference for 
live testimony—where the courtroom tools of the oath, observation of 
demeanor, and cross-examination help increase the accuracy and re-
liability of the testimony—the Court held that if the evidence was 
adequately reliable, then the benefits of confrontation were out-
weighed by the interests in public justice.41 
 In 1980, the Court attempted to impose a coherent analytical 
framework for hearsay and confrontation issues in Ohio v. Roberts.42 
Subsequent cases increasingly intertwined the analysis of eviden-
tiary and constitutional issues, effectively eroding the protection the 
right was intended to provide. The Court addressed these problem-
atic developments by completely shifting gears in Crawford v. Wash-
ington. In Crawford, the Court reexamined the origins of the right 
and concluded that both the history and text of the Clause compelled 
the Court to redirect the focus of its analysis to the procedural aspect 
of the right of confrontation.43  
                                                                                                                     
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 38. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 48 (2004) (citing Virginia Declaration of 
Rights § 8 (1776); Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § IX (1776); Delaware Declaration of 
Rights § 14 (1776); Maryland Declaration of Rights § XIX (1776); North Carolina Declara-
tion of Rights § VII (1776); Vermont Declaration of Rights Ch. I, § X (1777); Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights § XII (1780); New Hampshire Bill of Rights § XV (1783), all reprinted 
in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 235, 265, 278, 282, 287, 
323, 342, 377 (1971)). 
 39. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926). 
 40. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250 (1895). Although the Confrontation 
Clause was ratified in 1791, more than a century passed before the Supreme Court signifi-
cantly considered the meaning and the application of the Clause in Mattox. 
 41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
 42. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 43. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.  
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A.   The Reliability Era 
1.   Before 1980 
 In Mattox v. United States, the defendant had been convicted of a 
murder based in part on the in-court testimony of two witnesses.44 
The conviction was overturned and remanded for a new trial.45 By 
the time the new trial began, the two witnesses had died.46 Both had 
testified and had been cross-examined by the defendant at the previ-
ous trial.47 In lieu of their live testimony, the prosecutor offered as 
evidence the reporter’s stenographic notes of their testimony from 
the previous trial.48 Upon reconviction for murder, the defendant 
claimed his right to confront the witnesses against him had been vio-
lated by admission of the reporter’s notes.49 
 The Mattox Court stated that the primary objective of the Con-
frontation Clause   
was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were 
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner 
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the 
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of test-
ing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of 
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that 
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand 
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is 
worthy of belief.50 
While this right was an important aspect of a criminal trial, the 
Court explained that the right was not absolute; it “must occasionally 
give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the 
case.”51 The Court noted it could recognize an exception to a general 
rule without interfering with the spirit of the right.52 With that justi-
fication, the Court found that the “spirit” or the “substance” of the 
confrontation right was preserved in that the defendant once had the 
opportunity to see the witness face-to-face and to subject the witness 
to cross-examination.53 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240. 
 45. Id. at 238. 
 46. Id. at 240. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 242-43. 
 51. Id. at 243. In the Court’s view, live testimony from a witness is better than a tran-
script of former testimony, but if the witness is unavailable, it is better to have the tran-
script than no evidence at all. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 243, 244. Later in California v. Green, the Court similarly held that when 
the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970). 
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 As the Court continued to articulate the purposes of confronta-
tion,54 each interpretation was aimed at improving the truth-finding 
function of the trial by increasing the accuracy of the evidence.55 In 
California v. Green,56 the Court identified three main purposes of 
confrontation. First, the oath insures that a witness appreciates the 
seriousness of the matter and helps decrease the likelihood of false 
statement by threat of a penalty for perjury.57 Second, cross-
examination subjects a witness to “ ‘the greatest legal engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth.’ ”58 Third, observation of the wit-
ness’s demeanor assists the factfinder in assessing the witness’s 
credibility.59 In addressing hearsay issues, the Court acknowledged 
that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule “ ‘are generally 
designed to protect similar values.’ ”60 However, the Court asserted 
that it had “never equated the two.”61  
2.   Ohio v. Roberts 
 In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court attempted to establish a clear 
framework for the application of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay 
                                                                                                                     
The Court concluded that “substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confronta-
tion requirement” had been met. Id. at 166. 
 54. The significance of the confrontation right in American jurisprudence greatly ex-
panded in 1965 when the Court applied the Confrontation Clause to the states by incorpo-
rating the Sixth Amendment via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).  
 55. In Dutton v. Evans, the Court stated “that the mission of the Confrontation 
Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process.” 
400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion). The Court examined the circumstances under 
which the statement was made and found that it was “inconceivable that cross-
examination could have shown that [the accomplice] was not in a position to know whether 
or not [the defendant] was involved in the murder.” Id. at 88-89. 
 56. Green,  399 U.S. 149. 
 57. Id. at 158. 
 58. Id. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 59. Id.; see also Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (“[T]he Confrontation 
Clause’s very mission [is] to advance ‘the accuracy of the truth-determining process in 
criminal trials.’ ” (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89)). 
 60. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 81 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 155). 
 61. Id. at 86. Dutton involved a statement by the defendant’s accomplice to a fellow 
inmate. After returning from his arraignment, the accomplice stated to his fellow inmate 
that if it had not been for the defendant “ ‘we wouldn’t be in this now.’ ” Id. at 77. Even 
though the accomplice was never cross-examined regarding this statement, the Court 
found no Confrontation Clause violation by emphasizing that the case 
does not involve the use, or misuse, of a confession made in the coercive 
atmosphere of official interrogation . . . . It does not involve any sugges-
tion of prosecutorial misconduct or even negligence . . . . It does not in-
volve the use by the prosecution of a paper transcript . . . . It does not in-
volve a joint trial . . . . And it certainly does not involve the wholesale 
denial of cross-examination . . . .  
Id. at 87. The Court found that “the statement contained no express assertion about past 
fact.” Id. at 88. 
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evidence.62 In deciding to admit an unavailable witness’s former tes-
timony, the Court created a two-prong test requiring both unavail-
ability and reliability as a predicate to admissibility.63 
 Acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause establishes a pref-
erence for face-to-face accusations, the Court held that under a “rule 
of necessity,” the prosecution must either produce the witness or 
demonstrate his unavailability.64 If the declarant’s unavailability is 
established, then the out-of-court statement may be admissible only 
if the statement bears “indicia of reliability” sufficient to safeguard 
the Clause’s “underlying purpose [of] augment[ing] accuracy in the 
factfinding process.”65 To meet that standard of reliability, the Court 
determined that the evidence must either “fall[] within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”66  
 In applying the “indicia of reliability” requirement, the Court con-
cluded “that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid founda-
tions that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports 
with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’ ”67 The Court 
further explained that “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a 
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”68 Noting 
again that both the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are “ 
‘designed to protect similar values’ ”69 and that they “ ‘stem from the 
same roots,’ ”70 the Roberts analysis used hearsay law as a means of 
determining the constitutional admissibility of evidence. 
3.   Post-Ohio v. Roberts 
 As the constitutional confrontation standard evolved, gradually 
more out-of-court declarations were allowed to serve as evidence in 
place of in-court testimony. Soon after the Court set out the two-
prong test in Roberts, the necessity prong began to erode. The num-
ber of exceptions to the necessity requirement steadily increased un-
til a showing of unavailability was rarely required. Minimizing the 
necessity requirement was justified by the rationale that the hearsay 
statements were reliable, perhaps more reliable than in-court testi-
                                                                                                                     
 62.  448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 63. Id. at 65. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 65-66. 
 66. Id. at 66. 
 67. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)). 
 70. Id. (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).  
740  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:729 
 
mony.71 In 1992, the Court, in White v. Illinois, essentially eliminated 
the necessity prong for all types of hearsay cases except former tes-
timony.72 The Court went so far as to say that hearsay admissible 
“under a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception is so trustworthy that ad-
versarial testing can be expected to add little to [the statement’s] re-
liability.”73  
 Foreshadowing the radical shift to come in Crawford, Justices 
Thomas and Scalia in their concurrence suggested that the Court’s 
“Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is 
perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause itself.”74 
Justice Thomas then attacked the majority’s assumption “that all 
hearsay declarants are ‘witnesses against’ a defendant within the 
meaning of the Clause,” asserting that such an assumption is “nei-
ther warranted nor supported by the history or text of the Confronta-
tion Clause.”75 Setting forth an analysis of the term “witness,”76 Jus-
tice Thomas supported a narrow interpretation that included only 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-95, 399-400 (1986). The Court con-
cluded that the Constitution did not require a showing of unavailability prior to the admis-
sion of a co-conspirator’s statements because the circumstances in which the statements 
were given made them more reliable and could not be replicated on the stand. Id. 
 72.  502 U.S. 346 (1992). The Court held that the admission of a child’s statements to 
her babysitter, her mother, and a police officer under the spontaneous declaration excep-
tion and the admission of the child’s statements to a nurse and a doctor under the medical 
examination exception. did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. Id. at 348-51. 
At trial, there was no finding that the four-year-old child abuse victim was unavailable, 
but she did not testify. Id. at 350. By restricting the holding of Roberts to its facts, the 
Court stated, “Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary 
part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements 
were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.” Id. at 354 (citing Inadi, 475 U.S. 
at 394). 
 73. Id. at 357 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1990)). 
 74. Id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 75. Id. at 359 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. 805; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986); Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56). 
 76. Id. Justice Thomas first discussed Wigmore’s view of the term “witnesses.” Id. at 
359-60. He then analyzed the “plain language” of the Clause, quoting Justice Scalia’s dis-
sent in another recently decided case:  
The Sixth Amendment does not literally contain a prohibition upon [hear-
say] evidence, since it guarantees the defendant only the right to confront 
the “witnesses against him.” As applied in the Sixth Amendment’s context 
of a prosecution, the noun “witness”—in 1791 as today—could mean ei-
ther (a) one “who knows or sees any thing; one personally present” or (b) 
“one who gives testimony” or who “testifies,” i.e., “[i]n judicial proceed-
ings, [one who] make[s] a solemn declaration under oath, for the purpose 
of establishing or making proof of some fact to a court.” The former mean-
ing (one ‘who knows or sees’) would cover hearsay evidence, but is ex-
cluded in the Sixth Amendment by the words following the noun: ‘wit-
nesses against him.’ The phrase obviously refers to those who give testi-
mony against the defendant at trial. 
Id. at 360 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)) (alterations in original). 
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those who actually appear and testify at trial.77 Attempting to be 
faithful to the text and history of the Confrontation Clause, Justice 
Thomas suggested a formulation that encompasses “extrajudicial 
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimo-
nial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, 
or confessions.”78 
 In the years following Roberts, the Court continued to focus on the 
reliability of the hearsay statement to determine whether the Con-
frontation Clause required in-court cross-examination.79 If the state-
ment was not a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, the Court looked 
only at the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement 
for indicia of reliability.80 The Court’s rationale for this limitation 
was based on the notion that the trustworthiness of the statement 
depends on information normally obtained through cross-
examination.81 In other words, circumstantial indicia of trustworthi-
ness best replace what is lost by lack of cross-examination.  
 Roberts bound the constitutional issue of confrontation with the 
evidentiary issue of hearsay reliability. Academics have long criti-
cized this approach for diminishing defendants’ rights to confronta-
tion and for determining reliability with a standard that was vague, 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 59-60. Justice Thomas noted the difficulty in adopting this narrow meaning 
due to the history of the right of confrontation at common law and the Court’s own prece-
dent. Id. at 360. Justice Thomas also discussed the potential difficulty courts face in im-
plementing a standard to discern which statements are made in contemplation of legal 
proceedings. Id. at 364 (“Attempts to draw a line between statements made in contempla-
tion of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of 
difficulties. Few types of statements could be categorically characterized as within or with-
out the reach of a defendant’s confrontation rights. Not even statements made to the police 
or government officials could be deemed automatically subject to the right of confrontation 
(imagine a victim who blurts out an accusation to a passing police officer, or the unsuspect-
ing social-services worker who is told of possible child abuse). It is also not clear under the 
United States’ approach whether the declarant or the listener (or both) must be contem-
plating legal proceedings. The United States devotes little attention to the application of 
its proposed standard in this case.”). 
 78. Id. at 365. Justice Thomas claimed that this approach both satisfies the intent of 
the Clause to address statements that were historically abused by prosecutors and justifies 
the Court’s outcomes in the confrontation cases preceding Roberts. Id. at 365. 
 79. But see id. at 363-64 (criticizing the Court’s jurisprudence in construing the Con-
frontation Clause as only barring unreliable hearsay and suggesting that “[r]eliability is 
more properly a due process concern”). 
 80. In Idaho v. Wright, the child’s statements to a doctor were admitted under the 
state’s residual hearsay exception, which was not a “firmly rooted” exception. 497 U.S. at 
811-12, 817-18 (1990). The Court held that in determining whether there are “particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness,” a court can consider only “relevant circumstances . . . 
that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly wor-
thy of belief” and may not consider “other evidence at trial that corroborates the truth of 
the statement.” Id. at 819.  
 81.  Id. at 822-23. 
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arbitrary, and subjective.82 When the category of firmly rooted hear-
say exceptions was stretched to include an accomplice’s confession 
that inculpated the accused,83 the Court disagreed and found that the 
statements against the declarant’s penal interest did not, “in light of 
‘longstanding judicial and legislative experience,’ ”84 “ ‘[rest on] such 
[a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any evidence within 
[it] comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’ ”85 
However, the rationales for this holding diverged, and in his concur-
rence, Justice Breyer left the door open for the changes to come 
in Crawford.86 
B.   Identifying a Bold New Path—Crawford v. Washington 
 In 2004, the Court, in Crawford v. Washington, seized the oppor-
tunity to untangle the Confrontation Clause from hearsay rules and 
to reframe completely the analysis by returning to the Clause’s 
“original meaning.”87 Michael Crawford had been accused of stabbing 
a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.88 When Michael 
and Sylvia were arrested and taken to the police station, they were 
individually questioned about their involvement in the stabbing.89 
Detectives gave both Michael and Sylvia Miranda warnings before 
the Crawfords gave statements to the police.90 Michael’s statement 
arguably suggested that the victim may have reached for a weapon 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1011 (1998); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doc-
trine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691. 
 83. In Lilly v. Virginia, the trial court admitted a taped statement that the defen-
dant’s accomplice gave to the police that implicated himself and the defendant as a state-
ment against penal interest. 527 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1999).  
 84. Id. at 126 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 817). 
 85. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). The plurality’s opinion stated 
that an accomplice’s confession that inculpated the accused is not a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception and that admission of the statement was a violation of the defendant’s confronta-
tion rights. Id. at 139. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Ken-
nedy did not agree that the Confrontation Clause so broadly imposed a “blanket ban on the 
government’s use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant.” Id. at 147 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 86. Id. at 142-43 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated: 
We need not reexamine the current connection between the Confrontation 
Clause and the hearsay rule in this case, however, because the state-
ments at issue violate the Clause regardless. I write separately to point 
out that the fact that we do not reevaluate the link in this case does not 
end the matter. It may leave the question open for another day. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 87. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). Justice Scalia wrote for the 
majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred with the judg-
ment. 
 88. Id. at 38. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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first.91 Sylvia’s statement arguably suggested that Michael was the 
aggressor and that the victim did not reach for, or did not have, a 
weapon before the stabbing.92  
 At trial, Michael claimed the stabbing was in self-defense.93 He 
asserted his evidentiary marital privilege and prevented Sylvia from 
testifying.94 Unable to call Sylvia as a witness, the prosecution 
sought to use her tape-recorded statement to rebut the defendant’s 
self-defense theory.95 The trial court admitted Sylvia’s hearsay 
statement under the exception for statements against penal inter-
est.96 Furthermore, the trial court held that the statement did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause, as construed in Roberts, because it 
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”97  
                                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 38-39. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever see anything in [Lee’s] hands? 
A. I think so, but I’m not positive. 
Q. Okay, when you think so, what do you mean by that? 
A. I could a swore I seen him goin’ for somethin’ before, right before everything 
happened. He was like reachin’, fiddlin’ around down here and stuff . . . and I just 
. . . I don’t know, I think, this is just a possibility, but I think, I think that he 
pulled somethin’ out and I grabbed for it and that’s how I got cut . . . but I’m not 
positive. I, I, my mind goes blank when things like this happen. I mean, I just, I 
remember things wrong, I remember things that just doesn’t, don’t make sense to 
me later. 
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 155, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410) [hereinafter Craw-
ford Appendix]). 
 92. Id. at 39.  
Q. Did Kenny do anything to fight back from this assault? 
A. (pausing) I know he reached into his pocket  . . . or somethin’ . . . I don’t 
know what. 
Q. After he was stabbed? 
A. He saw Michael coming up. He lifted his hand . . . his chest open, he 
might [have] went to go strike his hand out or something and then (inau-
dible). 
Q. Okay, you, you gotta speak up. 
A. Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael’s hand 
down or something and then he put his hands in his . . . put his right 
hand in his right pocket . . . took a step back . . . Michael proceeded to 
stab him . . . then his hands were like . . . how do you explain this . . . 
open arms . . . with his hands open and he fell down . . . and we ran (de-
scribing subject holding hands open, palms toward assailant). 
Q. Okay, when he’s standing there with his open hands, you’re talking 
about Kenny, correct? 
A. Yeah, after, after the fact, yes. 
Q. Did you see anything in his hands at that point? 
A. (pausing) um um (no). 
Id. at 39-40 (quoting Crawford Appendix, supra note 91, at 137). 
 93. Id. at 40. 
 94. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)).  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (citing WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2003)). The statement implicated Sylvia as an 
accomplice because she had admitted to assisting in the assault by leading the defendant 
to the victim’s residence. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). 
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 Michael Crawford was convicted of assault.98 On appeal, the case 
flipped back and forth as the Washington courts came to opposite 
conclusions about the trustworthiness, and thus admissibility, of 
Sylvia’s statement.99 While the U. S. Supreme Court could have re-
versed the judgment within the existing framework of Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence,100 the Court forged a new path which it rooted 
in the history of the Clause.101  
1.   Crawford and the Confrontation Clause 
 The Crawford Court began with a textual analysis but was quick 
to conclude that the text alone was insufficient to resolve the issue.102 
The Court conceded that the phrase “witnesses against [the accused]” 
could be interpreted broadly to include all declarants whose state-
ments were offered at trial,103 narrowly to include only those who ap-
pear and actually testify at trial,104 or “something in-between.”105 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Id. at 41. 
 99. The Washington Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and applied a 
nine-factor test to determine that Sylvia’s statement did not bear particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness and therefore its admission violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. 
The Washington Supreme Court then reversed with a logically incoherent conclusion. Id. 
The State offered Sylvia’s statement precisely because it differed from the defendant’s 
statement on the critical issue of who may have reached for a weapon first. However, the 
court found that it was reliable because of its similarity with the defendant’s statement. Id. 
 100. As Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor argued in their separate opinion 
concurring with the judgment, the Court simply could have held that the Washington Su-
preme Court’s consideration of the defendant’s own statement and its interlocking nature 
with Sylvia’s statement impermissibly relied on corroborative evidence to indicate trust-
worthiness in violation of the rule established in Idaho v. Wright. Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-24 (1990)). 
 101. Id. at 42-50 (majority opinion). 
 102. Id. at 42-43. 
 103. Id. at 43 (citing 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 104 (2d ed.1923)). In White v. 
Illinois, Justices Thomas and Scalia characterized the majority’s approach to the Clause as 
adopting this view. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“Unfortunately, in recent cases in this area, the 
Court has assumed that all hearsay declarants are ‘witnesses against’ a defendant within 
the meaning of the Clause, see, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Lee v. Illinois, 476 
U.S. 530 (1986); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) . . . .”). Even though all hearsay de-
clarants could be “witnesses” within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the Court 
has consistently interpreted the Clause to allow some exceptions. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 
408 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1972). 
 104. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing Woodsides v. State, 3 Miss. 655, 664-65 (1837)); 
see also White, 502 U.S. at 359-60 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“The strictest reading would be to construe the phrase ‘witnesses against him’ 
to confer on a defendant the right to confront and cross-examine only those witnesses who 
actually appear and testify at trial.”). 
 105. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43. 
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 The Court then probed the history of the clause for meaning.106 In 
contrast to the continental civil law procedures that allowed judicial 
officers to examine witnesses in private, the Court found that Eng-
lish common law tradition involved an actual meeting between the 
accused and the witnesses who gave testimony in court and were 
subjected to adversarial testing of their testimony.107 Citing examples 
of deviations from this procedure—the most famous of which was the 
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh—the Court concluded that Eng-
lish law developed a right of confrontation through subsequent statu-
tory and judicial reforms to limit those abuses.108 
 From this review of history, the Court derived two important in-
ferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.109 First, the 
Court articulated that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, 
and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against 
the accused.”110 Second, the Court inferred “that the Framers would 
not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness 
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and 
the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”111 
 Ultimately, the Court rejected the broadest and narrowest inter-
pretations of the Clause and concluded that the Constitution requires 
“something in-between.”112 Then, referring back to the text, the Court 
attempted to establish the plain meaning of the word “witness” by 
referencing a contemporary edition of Webster’s Dictionary that de-
fined “witnesses” as “those who ‘bear testimony.’ ”113 The same dic-
tionary, in turn, defined “testimony,” as “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact.’ ”114 
                                                                                                                     
 106.  Though many scholars have noted the dearth of documentation of the Framers’ 
intended meaning of the Clause, many attempts have been made to trace the history of the 
concept of confrontation. See generally Herrmann & Speer, supra note 33; Jonakait, supra 
note 33; Pollitt, supra note 35; Peter Tillers, Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on 
the Role of History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause (Benjamin N. 
Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
110, 2005). The Court has traced the concept from the Roman era, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
43 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988); Herrmann & Speer, supra note 33); to 
English law, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43; and to the colonies. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-50. 
 107. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 373-74 (1768)). 
 108. Id. at 43-44. 
 109. Id. at 50. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 53-54. 
 112. Id. at 42-43, 68. 
 113. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)).  
 114. Id. (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 113). But see id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring in the judgment) (referencing the same dictionary alternatively “defining 
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 Following this guideline, the Court concluded that the Sixth 
Amendment barred “admission of testimonial statements of a wit-
ness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, 
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”115 In other words, “[w]here testimonial evidence is at 
issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law re-
quired: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”116  
2.   The “Testimonial” Thicket 
 Crawford transformed the constitutional landscape by requiring 
courts to determine which out-of-court statements are “testimonial” 
for Confrontation Clause purposes. The most significant issue follow-
ing Crawford is how, exactly, courts are to identify such state-
ments.117  
 The Crawford Court identified five types of statements as defini-
tively testimonial: prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,118 prior 
testimony before a grand jury,119 prior testimony at a former trial,120 
statements made during police interrogations,121 and guilty plea allo-
cutions.122 The Court listed the first four types of statements together 
within the same breath, as though they were equivalent.123 On closer 
examination, however, they are not equivalent. The first three are 
most commonly understood as testimonial statements because they 
are in fact sworn testimony given in a formal court setting. The 
Court wove police interrogations into the same cloth as prior in-court 
testimony by noting they share the “closest kinship to the abuses at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”124  
 Statements made during police interrogations, however, are sub-
stantially different from in-court testimony. Characterizing them as 
“clearly testimonial” requires a significant conceptual leap from in-
court sworn statements to unsworn statements made to a police offi-
                                                                                                                     
‘[t]estimony’ as ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact. Such affirmation in judicial proceedings, may be verbal or written, 
but must be under oath’ ” (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 113).  
 115. Id. at 53-54 (majority opinion). 
 116. Id. at 68. But see id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The 
Court’s distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its 
claim, is no better rooted in history than our current doctrine.”). 
 117. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 118. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 64.  
 123. See id. at 68.  
 124. Id.  
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cer.125 Using “the term ‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than 
any technical legal, sense,” the Court intentionally designed an op-
portunity for future development of what circumstances may consti-
tute a police interrogation.126 However, the Court declared that, at a 
minimum, when a declarant knowingly gives a recorded statement 
“in response to structured police questioning,” the statement is tes-
timonial.127  
 By analogizing police interrogations to examinations by the justice 
of the peace under the Marian statutes in Sir Walter Raleigh’s 
case,128 the Court attempted to ground its testimonial characteriza-
tion of police interrogations in history. However, by including state-
ments made outside a formalized legal setting, the Court substan-
tially expanded the scope of the definition of testimonial statements.  
 (a)   Crawford’s Three Formulations of the “Core Class of 
Testimonial Statements” 
 Outside of identifying a few categories of “clearly testimonial” 
statements and suggesting that a few others are not,129 the Crawford 
court deferred to “another day” the task of defining “testimonial.”130 
In the meantime, the Court suggested three formulations that com-
pose the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.”131 The narrowest 
formula encompassed those “ ‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained 
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions.’ ”132 The second included “ ‘ex parte 
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such 
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defen-
dant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutori-
                                                                                                                     
 125. The Court dismissed the importance of the oath as a critical factor in characteriz-
ing a statement as testimonial. Id. at 65. 
 126. Id. at 53 n.4.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 52. 
 129. The Crawford Court identified a few types of statements as clearly nontestimo-
nial, such as business records and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. Id. at 56. The 
Court also hinted at other statements that may be considered nontestimonial. See id. at 58 
n.8. For example, the Court suggested that “[a]n off-hand, overheard remark” may not be 
testimonial. Id. at 51 (“[The remark] bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the 
Confrontation Clause targeted.”). Additionally, a “casual remark to an acquaintance” may 
not be testimonial. Id. (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance 
does not.”). 
 130. Id. at 68. 
 131. Id. at 51. 
 132. Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). Justice Thomas again 
advocated this standard in his Davis dissent. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836-37 
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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ally.’ ”133 The broadest formulation included “ ‘statements that were 
made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness rea-
sonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.’ ”134  
 (b)   Other Routes of Admissibility for Out-of-Court Statements 
 The Court further discussed several situations in which an out-of-
court statement may be admissible regardless of its testimonial na-
ture. For example, the first circumscription the Court placed around 
the definition of “witnesses” was to limit the term to those declarants 
whose statements are offered for the truth of the matter asserted.135 
Therefore, if the out-of-court statement is being offered for some 
other, nonhearsay purpose, the Confrontation Clause poses no con-
cern.136 In addition, testimonial hearsay may be admissible when the 
declarant appears as a witness at trial subject to cross-examination 
regarding the prior statements137 or when the declarant is “unavail-
                                                                                                                     
 133. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410)). This formulation is potentially broader because 
there is no requirement that the statement be contained in formalized testimonial mate-
rial. However, a determination vesting a defendant’s confrontation right in a declarant’s 
reasonable expectation may ultimately turn on a reasonable declarant’s knowledge of 
criminal law and procedure—an unusual measure for a constitutional standard. 
 134. Id. at 52 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for National Ass’n of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-
9410)). Also, without the requirement of formality, this standard considers a third party’s 
perspective of what evidence may be available for use at trial, without specifying criminal 
or civil. This standard, again, relies on a reasonable person’s general knowledge of the ju-
dicial system as a standard for the application of a constitutional right. 
 135. Id. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). 
 136. Id. at 60 n.9. The meaning of the out-of-court statement may still be unclear or 
misleading. However, if the statement is offered to prove something other than its truth, 
then the question for the factfinder is whether the declarant really uttered the statement 
and whether the in-court witness really heard the declarant’s statement. Proof of this fact 
is like proof of any other perceived event. The witness’s testimonial capacities can be chal-
lenged on the stand and the factfinder will decide based on corroboration and credibility of 
the testifying witness.  
 137. Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). Professor Friedman ex-
pressed concern regarding the position that the Confrontation Clause poses no obstacle to 
admission of the witness’s prior statements if that witness testifies subject to cross-
examination at trial. Richard Friedman, The Crawford Transformation, AALS SEC. ON 
EVID. NEWSL. (Am. Ass’n L. Sch., Wash. D.C.), Spring 2004, at 4. In particular, Professor 
Friedman highlights the problems of substantively admitting prior statements that the 
witness no longer affirms. Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman, Prior Statements of a Witness: 
A Nettlesome Corner of the Hearsay Thicket, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 277 (1995). Given the 
Court’s adherence to this position, Professor Friedman notes that there may be increased 
pressure to eliminate the hearsay barrier to all prior statements of a witness. Friedman, 
The Crawford Transformation, supra, at 4. 
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able to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”138  
 The Crawford Court also suggested there may be other exceptions 
to the Confrontation Clause that are unrelated to the Roberts reli-
ability rationale. For example, if declarants are rendered unavailable 
by the defendant’s wrongdoing, their testimonial hearsay statements 
may be admissible under the equitable rule of forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing.139 As in the exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule codified in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(b)(6), the rationale for admitting such 
evidence is not based on the theory that it is more reliable, but on the 
grounds that the defendant should not benefit from his own wrongdo-
ing.140 
 Finally, the Court acknowledged the longstanding exception to the 
hearsay rule for dying declarations.141 Conceding that a dying decla-
ration may be testimonial, the Court in Crawford declined to explic-
itly make it an exception to the application of the Confrontation 
Clause.142 Nevertheless, it suggested that such a singular exception 
might be accepted on historical grounds.143 
 (c)   Applicability of the Confrontation Clause to Nontestimonial 
Statements? 
 Crawford appeared to leave open the question of what, if any, con-
frontation rights applied to nontestimonial hearsay statements.144 
                                                                                                                     
 138. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. However, the admissibility of these statements may 
depend on whether the prior opportunity for cross-examination was constitutionally suffi-
cient. 
 139. Id. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879)) (“[T]he rule 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essen-
tially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining re-
liability.”). 
 140. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 806(b)(6) advisory committee’s notes.  
 141. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. Note, however, that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
further limit the use of such statements to homicide prosecutions. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. (“We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates 
an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on his-
torical grounds, it is sui generis.”). Professor Richard Friedman has suggested a more theo-
retically sound basis for the admissibility of testimonial dying declarations that is based on 
the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing. He advocates the cautious application of the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of 
Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506, 508 (1997). 
 144. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. (“[E]ven if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned 
with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object . . . .”). “Where nontestimonial hearsay 
is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in 
their development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that ex-
empted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Id. at 68. Com-
mentators have criticized the potential impact of Crawford and Davis for diminishing a de-
fendant’s ability to challenge possibly unreliable evidence when nontestimonial hearsay 
evidence may be admitted with no confrontation review analysis. See, e.g., Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis and Bockting, 19 REGENT U. L. 
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The Court severely criticized the reliability-based analysis of Roberts 
and its progeny, stating that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not en-
tirely subjective, concept.”145 Describing Roberts as an “open-ended 
balancing test” with only “vague standards” that are “manipulable,” 
the Court warned that such a standard may often fail to provide “any 
meaningful protection.”146 Whether the test is characterized as ma-
nipulable, malleable, or flexible, it fundamentally was not a bright-
line test. In reiterating its procedural interpretation of the Confron-
tation Clause guarantee, the Court emphasized that reliability 
should be determined through cross-examination rather than the fal-
lible methods that followed the Roberts line of cases.147 
 The Court acknowledged that in White it rejected the theory that 
the Confrontation Clause was applicable only to testimonial state-
ments.148 While the Crawford Court explicitly acknowledged that its 
analysis cast doubt on the holding in White, it declined to resolve the 
issue of whether Confrontation Clause protections apply to nontesti-
monial statements—instead, it narrowly ruled on the facts of the 
present case, where it characterized Sylvia Crawford’s statement as 
“testimonial under any definition.”149  
 Without explicit direction from the Court,150 lower courts contin-
ued to apply Roberts before admitting nontestimonial statements in 
the wake of Crawford.151 However, given the Court’s reasoning that 
confrontation is based on the procedural right of the defendant, the 
rationale for judicial review of reliability of nontestimonial state-
ments was substantially undermined.  
 (d)   Right to Confrontation for Testimonial Statements 
 The second primary component of Confrontation Clause interpre-
tation explores what it means to “enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with”152 witnesses. In 1970, Justice Harlan suggested, “If one were to 
translate the Confrontation Clause into language in more common 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 367 (2007); Myrna S. Raeder, Confrontation Clause Analysis After Davis, 22 CRIM. 
JUST. 10, 15 (2007). 
 145. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
 146. Id. at 67-68. 
 147. Id. at 61. 
 148. Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992)). 
 149. Id.  
 150. See id. at 53, 68. In Davis and Bockting, the Court determined that the Confronta-
tion Clause applies only to testimonial statements. See infra Part III; see also infra notes 
441-43 and accompanying text.  
 151. See James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. Roberts, 21 
CRIM. JUST. 37, 37 (2006) (citing United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1204 (11th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 179 
& n.7 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004)).  
 152. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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use today, it would read: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to be present and to cross-examine the witnesses 
against him.’ ”153 The Court has recognized several elements of the 
confrontation right,154 including the physical face-to-face presence of 
the witness in court with the defendant and the “implied and collat-
eral rights such as cross-examination, oath, and observation of de-
meanor.”155 
 i.   Witness Testimony in the Presence of the Accused 
 One meaning of confrontation derives from a literal interpretation 
of the term, that the accused should physically meet his accuser face-
to-face.156 The Court noted that a “face-to-face encounter between 
witness and accused serves ends related both to appearances and to 
reality.”157 Courts have reasoned that such a meeting increases the 
perceived fairness of the process.158 Furthermore, the interpersonal 
meeting may actually increase the likelihood that the witness’s tes-
timony is truthful and reliable. A witness may be discouraged from 
lying in the presence of the defendant out of a sense of shame or 
knowledge that the lie may be exposed.159 Imposing this obligation on 
the accuser lends respect to the accusation and assures that the de-
                                                                                                                     
 153. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 154. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990). 
 155. Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution “explicitly pro-
vides for ‘face-to-face’ confrontation” and therefore it is an “indispensible element” of 
the right). 
 156. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020-22 (1988) (holding it was a violation of the de-
fendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation to allow two children who were alleged victims 
of sexual abuse to testify behind a screen placed in the courtroom that prevented the vic-
tims from having eye contact with the defendant). Quoting the Bible as a historical refer-
ence, the Court noted that 
The Roman Governor Festus, discussing the proper treatment of his pris-
oner, Paul, stated: “It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man 
up to die before the accused has met his accusers face-to-face, and has 
been given a chance to defend himself against the charges.” 
Id. at 1015-16 (quoting Acts 25:16). The Court then traced the development of its cases and 
concluded that the Confrontation Clause guarantees a face-to-face meeting between the de-
fendant and the witness. Id. at 1016-17. 
 Nevertheless, the right has not been absolute. In limited situations, the Court has al-
lowed the presence of the witness to be modified from the traditional face-to-face, in-court 
confrontation with the defendant. On the heels of Coy, a five justice majority held that it 
did not offend the confrontation right to allow a child witness to testify via a one-way 
closed circuit television after a particularized finding that “ ‘testimony by the child victim 
in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the 
child cannot reasonably communicate.’ ” Craig, 497 U.S. at 841 (quoting MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. §9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)). The child was in a separate room with the prose-
cutor and the defense attorney and could not see the defendant. Id. at 841-42. The jury and 
the defendant were able to view the child on the television. Id. 
 157. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017. 
 158. Id. at 1019. 
 159. Id. 
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clarant stands behind the statement, quite literally.160 Crawford con-
tinues to require the witness’s physical face-to-face presence for tes-
timony at trial, making an exception only if the witness is unavail-
able161 and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.  
 ii.   Opportunity for Cross-Examination 
 Cross-examination not only provides an opportunity for a defen-
dant to challenge the credibility of the witness’s testimony, but also 
allows the defendant a means to further develop the testimony. 
Questioning the witness about prior statements can assist the de-
fense by filling in the gaps or by clarifying ambiguities that may be 
misleading. Providing this additional information reduces the likeli-
hood that a jury may otherwise fill the gaps with speculation. 
Through cross-examination, the defendant can also challenge the 
memory and perception of the witness.  
 While courts use the language “opportunity” for cross-
examination, it remains undetermined what kind of “opportunity” is 
constitutionally sufficient. In some cases the Court has evaluated the 
substance and scope of cross-examination and found that a trial 
court’s limitations were unconstitutional violations of the defendant’s 
right of confrontation.162  
 If the court is treating the prior testimonial statement as the 
functional equivalent of prior testimony, then the same considera-
tions underlying the sufficiency of the prior cross-examination for 
statements admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) 
should be present in the Confrontation Clause analysis. Federal Rule 
of Evidence 804(b)(1) states that the party against whom the hearsay 
is offered must have not only had an opportunity, but also a “similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examina-
tion.”163  
                                                                                                                     
 160. See Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation 
Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258 (2003). 
 161. Although Crawford is silent about any particular standard of unavailability, 
courts are likely to adhere to established doctrine. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 
212-13 (1972) (declarant, who was in Sweden, was unavailable when beyond the reach of 
process from state court); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) (declarant, incarcer-
ated in a federal prison in another state, was not unavailable unless the state had made a 
good faith effort to produce him); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining unavailability for 
hearsay purposes). 
 162. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (holding that the court 
cannot preclude questioning about matters relevant to bias or motivation); Davis v. Alaska, 
415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (holding that it was unconstitutional to prohibit cross-
examination on the witness’s prior juvenile criminal history).  
 163. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (emphasis added). For example, the Second Circuit in 
United States v. DiNapoli held that a defendant could not offer the grand jury testimony of 
two witnesses against the prosecution at trial because the prosecution did not have “an in-
terest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a substan-
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 However, if the declarant appears for trial and the defendant has 
the opportunity to cross-examine regarding the hearsay state-
ments,164 courts have been reluctant to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the cross-examination.165 Therefore, the Confrontation Clause is not 
violated by admitting a declarant’s prior testimonial statements as 
long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to cross-
examination.166  
 iii.   Oath and Observation of Demeanor 
 The oath, as an element of confrontation, serves to “impress[] [the 
witness] with the seriousness of the matter and guard[] against the 
lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury.”167 While the justices 
differed on the historical significance of the oath in determining 
whether the Confrontation Clause applied to out-of-court statements, 
the majority demonstrated that “the absence of oath was not disposi-
tive” on whether a statement was subject to the Confronta-
tion Clause.168  
                                                                                                                     
tially similar issue” for admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). 8 F.3d.
909, 910, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1993). To make this determination, the court considered the na-
ture of the prior proceeding, the burden of proof, the context of the prior proceeding, and 
the extent of the cross-examination. Id. at 912-14. The court found that the nature of the 
grand jury proceeding was a preliminary investigation which was unlike trying to prove a 
claim at trial and that the low burden of proof at the grand jury was dissimilar to the high 
burden at trial and thus the motive for developing the testimony was substantially differ-
ent. Id. at 913. Finally, the court found that the context of the grand jury examination was 
limited by other interests that were not present at trial. Id. at 913-14.  
 In other cases, the Court has held that the use of preliminary hearing testimony at the 
subsequent trial was constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980) (allowing the prosecution to use a defense witness’s preliminary hearing testimony 
against the defendant). 
 164. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970) (holding that when the declarant 
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at 
all on the use of his prior testimonial statements). 
 165. For example, in United States v. Owens, a five-to-four majority of the Court held 
that constitutional requirements are satisfied whenever the hearsay declarant is produced 
at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. 484 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1988). In 
Owens, the victim suffered a severe head injury as the result of an attack. Id. at 556. About 
a month after the attack, an FBI agent visited the victim in the hospital and questioned 
him, and the victim identified the defendant as his assailant. Id. At trial, the victim was 
unable to proffer much information on direct or cross-examination. Id. Although he testi-
fied that he remembered stating that Owens had assaulted him, he did not remember any-
thing about the attack and did not remember any of his hospital visitors. Id. 
 166. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004) (citing Green, 399 U.S. 
at 162). 
 167. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. 
 168. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (noting that the statement at issue in Sir Walter Ra-
leigh’s trial was unsworn). But Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that historically, un-
sworn hearsay had lesser evidentiary value and lesser credibility among juries. Id.  at 69 
n.1, 70 n.2, 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Using the dictionary cited by 
the majority as a reference for the meaning of “testimonial,” Chief Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that it was not clear that Framers were as concerned with unsworn statements as 
with sworn statements. Id. at 71. 
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 The opportunity for the jury to observe the demeanor of the wit-
ness in making his statement is an element of confrontation because 
such observations can assist “the jury in assessing [the witness’s] 
credibility.”169 But this element of confrontation is also not disposi-
tive. While the jury is never able to make demeanor observations at 
the moment the out-of-court statement is uttered, seeing the decla-
rant at trial gives “the jury a chance to observe and evaluate his de-
meanor as he either disavows or qualifies his earlier statement.”170  
  Since the Court handed down the Crawford decision, lower courts 
have struggled to apply the new standard. With some exceptions, the 
Crawford Court explicitly decided that it would “leave for another 
day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ 
”171 While the Court acknowledged that its refusal to provide clear 
guidance would leave lower courts to struggle with implementing the 
new standard, it attempted to downplay the impact on courts by not-
ing that the new uncertainty is no worse than the prior uncer-
tainty.172 Predictably, lower courts have indeed been struggling. A 
sample review of post-Crawford decisions demonstrates that courts 
have used the new standard to arrive at widely divergent conclu-
sions.173 
 While the rationale for the new analysis was arguably more fitted 
to the language and the history of the Sixth Amendment, the deter-
mination for the trial court judge has not been simplified. The duty of 
the trial court judge has shifted from determining the reliability of 
the hearsay evidence to determining the testimonial nature of the 
declarant’s statement. As a matter of constitutional text, Crawford’s 
bold new path may seem simple, but it is hardly clear of conceptual 
obstacles over which lower court judges will inevitably stumble in 
making admissibility decisions.  
III.   BEGINNING TO CLEAR THE THICKET: DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
 Two years after Crawford, the Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Davis v. Washington,174 another important Confrontation Clause 
case that purports to clear some of the testimonial thicket. In Davis, 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Green, 399 U.S. at 158; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-
43 (1895). 
 170. Green, 399 U.S. at 160. 
 171. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 172. Id. at 68 n.10. 
 173.  See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005) (child’s state-
ments to forensic interviewer testimonial); Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2005) (certification that breathalyzer is working properly was testimonial); Rackoff v. 
State, 637 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 2006) (certification regarding breathalyzer was not testimonial); 
State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2007) (child’s statement to nurse in interview ar-
ranged by police was not testimonial). 
 174. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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the Court began to clarify when out-of-court statements may be used 
in place of in-court testimony without violating a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses.175 The case, which involved 
the admissibility of statements by alleged victims of domestic vio-
lence, provided the Court with a much-needed opportunity to further 
define “testimonial” by determining which police interrogations pro-
duce statements that fall within the prohibition of the Confrontation 
Clause as set forth in Crawford. In addition, it provided the Court 
with an opportunity to provide clear guidelines for lower courts in 
addressing the many new questions that arose as they applied the 
Crawford approach. In the end, the Court’s decision provided some 
guidance, but not enough. For certain kinds of questions, including in 
domestic violence cases like those that were before the Court, lower 
courts remain on a murky path.  
A.   An Independent Pair of Domestic Violence Cases 
 The Court’s opinion in Davis is based on independent appeals of 
two state supreme court cases, State v. Davis176 and Hammon v. 
State,177 that were consolidated on the grant of certiorari and argued 
in tandem. The issue in both cases was whether the domestic vio-
lence victim’s excited utterances were testimonial statements subject 
to the Confrontation Clause.178 Davis involved an alleged victim’s 
statements to a 911 operator naming her assailant.179 Similarly, 
Hammon involved an oral accusation made to an investigating officer 
at the scene of the alleged crime.180  
1.   State v. Davis 
 State v. Davis arose from Adrian Davis’s alleged violation of a 
court order that prohibited him from having any contact with Mi-
chelle McCottry.181 On February 1, 2001, a 911 emergency operator 
answered a call, but the call ended before anyone spoke.182 When the 
operator reversed the call, Michelle McCottry answered.183 McCottry 
                                                                                                                     
 175. Justice Scalia, author of the majority opinion in Crawford, also wrote for the ma-
jority in Davis. Id. Of course, in the two years between the decisions in Crawford and Da-
vis, the composition of the Supreme Court changed. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor, who had both disagreed with the reformation of the Court’s approach to the 
Confrontation Clause in Crawford, were no longer on the Court.  
 176. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 177. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
 178. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.  
 179. Id. at 817-18.  
 180. Id. at 819-21.  
 181. Joint Appendix at 3-5, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-5224), 2005 WL 3617525 [here-
inafter Davis Appendix]. 
 182. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 
 183. Id. 
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was crying and sounded frantic184 and hysterical.185 The operator 
asked her, “ ‘What’s going on?’ ”186 Over a period of about four min-
utes—including an interruption when McCottry left the telephone to 
close her door187—the operator determined the basic events leading 
up to the call.188 At trial, the prosecution used the information that 
McCottry communicated at the very beginning of the call to establish 
the identity of the assailant.189  
 Later in the conversation, McCottry told the operator “that Davis 
had ‘just r[un] out the door’ after hitting [her], and that he was leav-
ing in a car with someone else.”190 At one point, she started talking, 
but the operator interrupted by saying, “ ‘Stop talking and answer 
my questions.’ ”191 McCottry informed the operator that Davis had 
                                                                                                                     
 184. State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661, 663, 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).  
 185. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). Contra id. at 854 (Sand-
ers, J., dissenting) (“While McCottry was upset, the majority mischaracterizes the tape 
when the majority describes McCottry as ‘hysterical and crying.’ In fact, the first sounds 
heard in the call-back are not those reflected in the official transcript of the tape, but ra-
ther McCottry instructing an unknown person to ‘put [unintelligible] down,’ and a male 
voice responding ‘c’mon baby.’ It is a full 10 seconds before McCottry answers the 911 op-
erator’s ‘hello.’ During that 10 seconds McCottry does not ask for help. In fact, at no time 
does McCottry ask for help.” (internal citations and footnote omitted)). 
 186. Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 8. 
 187. Id. at 11; see also Davis, 64 P.3d at 664.  
 188. Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 8-13. 
 189. The transcript is as follows: 
911 Operator: Hello.  
Complainant: Hello.  
911 Operator: What’s going on?  
Complainant: He’s here jumpin’ on me again.  
911 Operator: Okay. Listen to me carefully. Are you in a house or an 
apartment?  
Complainant: I’m in a house.  
911 Operator: Are there any weapons?  
Complainant: No. He’s usin’ his fists.  
911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking? 
Complainant: No.  
911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I’ve got help started. Stay on the line with 
me, okay?  
Complainant: I’m on the line.  
            911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his last name?  
Complainant: It’s Davis.  
911 Operator: Davis? Okay, what’s his first name?  
Complainant: Adrian  
911 Operator: What is it?  
Complainant: Adrian.  
911 Operator: Adrian?  
Complainant: Yeah.  
911 Operator: Okay. What’s his middle initial?  
Complainant: Martell. He’s runnin’ now. 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817-18 (2006) (quoting Davis Appendix, supra note 
181, at 8-9). The Court determined this was the only portion of the 911 call that contained 
“[t]he relevant statements” for decision on appeal. Id. at 817. 
 190. Id. at 818 (quoting Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 9-10). 
 191. Id. (quoting Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 10). 
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told her that he came to the house “ ‘to get his stuff’ ” because she 
was moving.192 After she “described the context of the assault,”193 the 
operator told her that the police would check the area to try to find 
Davis and then come talk with her.194 The operator offered the assis-
tance of an aid car but McCottry declined, stating that she was 
all right.195 
 Within four minutes of the 911 call, two officers arrived at the res-
idence where McCottry and her three children were present.196 The 
officers observed that the house was in disarray, clothes were strewn 
all over, and “McCottry was visibly upset and crying.”197 “[S]he was 
frantically moving around the house and packing” as she spoke with 
the officers.198 One of the officers observed that McCottry had several 
“fresh injuries on her forearm and face”199 that had started to swell.200  
 On hearsay grounds, the trial court ruled that McCottry’s state-
ments on the 911 tape were admissible as excited utterances,201 but 
that her statements to the officers at the residence were not.202 Davis 
objected to the 911 tape on Confrontation Clause grounds, but the 
trial court overruled the objection and admitted the tape.203 Although 
under subpoena,204 McCottry failed to appear for trial205 and could not 
be located.206 The state’s evidence included the no contact order, the  
                                                                                                                     
 192. Id. (quoting Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 11-12). 
 193. Id. (citing Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 11-12). 
 194. Id. (citing Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 12-13. 
 195. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (“The fact that the opera-
tor determined McCottry did not need an aid car does not necessarily mean McCottry was 
out of danger or that her subsequent responses were then testimonial. Her 911 call was 
part of an ongoing emergency situation.”). 
 196. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818. 
 197. State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).  
 198. Id.   
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 664.  
 202. Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 34-40. 
 203. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819 (2006). The 911 tape admitted at trial was 
redacted to exclude portions relating to prior police contact with Davis at the residence two 
days before the charged offense. Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 8-13, 20-21; see also 
State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 n.1 (Wash. 2005). 
 204. Davis, 64 P.3d at 666; see also Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 60-61.  
 205. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819. 
 206. Davis, 64 P.3d at 666. The prosecutor had spoken with McCottry by telephone the 
night before her scheduled appearance, and McCottry had indicated that she would be pre-
sent for trial. Id. at 665 n.22; Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 18. McCottry did not ap-
pear the day before trial for a defense interview. Davis, 64 P.3d at 666. The victim’s advo-
cate was able to locate McCottry and learned that she had been at the hospital and that 
she was in fear because there had been contact between McCottry and Davis where Davis 
“told her that if she appeared in Court his defense attorney was going to make her out to 
be a liar, and that he would make sure that their children were taken away from her, 
things of that nature.” Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 22-23 (quoting prosecutor Nicole 
Gaines); see also Davis, 64 P.3d at 666. The Court of Appeals found that “the State used all 
available means to locate McCottry.” Id. When she failed to appear, the prosecutor imme-
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911 tape, photographs, and the officers’ testimony.207  
 Davis did not testify at trial or call any witnesses on his own be-
half, and a jury convicted Davis for felony violation of a domestic no 
contact court order.208 The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction based on pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause analysis.209 
While Davis was pending before the Washington Supreme Court, 
Crawford was decided.210 The Washington Supreme Court, with one 
dissenting justice, affirmed the conviction under Crawford’s analysis, 
finding that the critical part of the 911 conversation (in which the 
victim identified Davis as the perpetrator) was not testimonial.211 If 
other portions were testimonial, the Court found that they were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.212 The Washington Supreme 
Court looked at the declarant’s subjective intent213 and found that 
“McCottry called 911 because of an immediate danger”214 during “an 
ongoing emergency situation.”215 Citing the lack of evidence that she 
sought to “ ‘bear witness,’ ” the court found her statements to be non-
testimonial.216 The one dissenting justice criticized the court’s consid-
eration of the declarant’s subjective intent and argued that under a 
proper objective analysis, “a reasonable person today who calls 911 in 
                                                                                                                     
diately attempted to contact her personally and through the victim’s advocate. Id. A detec-
tive went to her last known address and attempted to find her address through a reverse 
phone directory. Id. 
 207. Davis, 111 P.3d at 847, 851. The officers described the scene of the crime, includ-
ing their observations of McCottry’s behavior, demeanor, and physical injuries. Davis, 547 
U.S. at 818-19 (“ ‘Both officers testified that McCottry exhibited injuries that appeared to 
be recent, but neither officer could testify as to the cause of the injuries.’ ” (quoting Davis, 
111 P.3d at 847)).  
 208. Id. The court sentenced Davis to fifteen months confinement. Brief for Petitioner 
at 9, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-5224) (citing Davis Appendix, supra note 181, at 85, 88). 
 209. Davis, 64 P.3d at 663.  
 210. Davis, 111 P.3d at 847-48. The Washington Supreme Court allowed the parties to 
submit additional briefs and reargue the case. Id. at 848. 
 211. Id. at 851.  
 212. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court did not review whether later parts of the 911 call 
were testimonial and, if so, whether their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-29. 
 213. Davis, 111 P.3d at 850. 
Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(WACDL) argues it is common knowledge that 911 calls may be used at 
subsequent trials and that McCottry reasonably knew her 911 call would 
later be used to prosecute Davis. Thus, McCottry’s call would fit within one 
of the core classifications of testimonial hearsay listed in Crawford. How-
ever, there is no evidence that McCottry had such knowledge or that it in-
fluenced her decision to call 911. 
Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted).  
 214. Id. at 851. 
 215. Id. at 850. The majority reasoned that statements “not concerned with seeking as-
sistance and protection from peril” may be testimonial. Id. at 851. 
 216. Id. at 849. 
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connection with a criminal act could anticipate that his or her state-
ment would be used in investigating and prosecuting the crime.”217 
2.   Hammon v. State 
 Hammon v. State arose from two police officers’ response to a dis-
patch concerning “a ‘reported domestic disturbance’ at the home of 
Hershel and Amy Hammon.”218 When the officers arrived at the 
house, they found Amy on the front porch appearing timid219 and “ 
‘somewhat frightened.’ ”220 One officer asked her if “there ‘was a prob-
lem and if anything was going on,’ ” and Amy answered “no.”221 After 
Amy gave permission to enter the house, the police went inside and 
noticed “the living room was in ‘disarray.’ ”222 One “officer saw ‘a gas 
heating unit in the corner of the living room’ that had ‘flames coming 
out of the . . . partial glass front. There were pieces of glass on the 
ground in front of it and there was flame emitting from the front of 
the heating unit.’ ”223 Hershel admitted “that he and his wife had 
‘been in an argument’ but ‘everything was fine now’ and the argu-
ment ‘never became physical.’ ”224 “One of the officers remained with 
Hershel; the other went to the living room to talk with Amy . . . .”225 
The officer testified that when he “ ‘again asked [her] what had oc-
curred,’ ”226 Amy 
informed [him] that she and Hershel had been in an argument. . . . 
The argument became . . . physical after being verbal and she in-
formed [him] that [Hershel], during the verbal part of the argu-
ment was breaking things in the living room.227 
The officer testified that he “ ‘believe[d] she stated he broke the 
phone, broke the lamp, broke the front of the heater. When it became 
physical he threw her down into the glass of the heater.’ ”228  
 While the officer was talking with Amy, Hershel tried to enter the 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Id. at 853 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
 218. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819 (2006) (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 
N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005)). 
 219. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  
 220. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819 (quoting Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446). 
 221. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 947. 
 222. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 948; see also Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 15. 
 223. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819 (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 16). 
 224. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447. 
 225. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819 (citing Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 820 (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 17-18). 
 228. Id. (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 17-18). In addition to her oral 
statement, Amy filled out and signed a battery affidavit recounting what she had already 
told the officer. Id. She wrote “ ‘Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor into the 
broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up 
my van where I couldn’t leave the house. Attacked my daughter.’ ” Id. (quoting Hammon 
Appendix, supra note 24, at 2). 
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living room at least twice.229 The officer observed that Amy “would 
become quiet, almost afraid to speak at that time.”230 While there 
were no visible injuries on Amy, she indicated that she had some 
pain from the attack.231  
 The officers arrested Hershel.232 Amy was not present at the 
trial.233 Over Hershel’s continuing hearsay objections, the trial court 
admitted Amy’s statements to the officer as excited utterances.234 Af-
ter a bench trial, Hershel was convicted of misdemeanor domestic 
battery and violation of his probation.235 The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction using Crawford, finding the victim’s re-
sponses to the officer’s “preliminary investigatory questions asked at 
the scene of [the] crime shortly after it has occurred” were not testi-
monial.236 The court differentiated between police questioning and 
police interrogation, finding that interrogations have “official and 
formal” as well as adversarial qualities.237 The Indiana Supreme 
Court affirmed.238 
B.   The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Davis v. Washington 
 The consolidated opinion in Davis, written by Justice Scalia, af-
firmed the state court opinion in Davis but reversed and remanded 
Hammon.239 Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in 
the judgment on the facts of Davis and dissenting in part on the facts 
of Hammon. Although the Court treated differently the facts of the 
                                                                                                                     
 229. Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 32. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Amy told the officer 
where her head was shoved into the glass and that her head was hurting her. Hammon 
Appendix, supra note 24, at 21. 
 232. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 948.  
 233. Davis, 547 U.S. at 820. 
 234. Id. (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, 40). Amy’s battery affidavit was 
admitted as a “present sense impression.” Id. 
 235. Id. at 821 (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 40). The court sentenced 
Hershel to one year in jail, “with all but twenty days suspended.” Hammon v. State, 829 
N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005).  
 236. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952. Without deciding whether Amy’s affidavit was tes-
timonial and therefore improperly admitted, the court noted that any error in admitting 
the affidavit was harmless error because it was cumulative of the officer’s testimony. Id. at 
948 n.1.  
 237. Id. at 952.  
 238. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 459. The Supreme Court of Indiana held the admission of 
the affidavit was a violation of the defendant’s confrontation rights, but also found that the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 458-59. 
 239. On remand, the Indiana Supreme Court treated Davis as if it compelled exclusion 
of Amy’s affidavit and any officer’s testimony regarding Amy’s statements at the Hammon 
home because Amy did not testify at trial. Hammon v. State, 853 N.E.2d 477, 478 (Ind. 
2006). The court reversed and remanded to the trial court for possible retrial. If retried, the 
trial court then could resolve “whether evidence otherwise excluded by the Sixth Amend-
ment may nevertheless be admitted under the doctrine of forfeiture explained by the [U.S.] 
Supreme Court.” Id.  
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two cases before it, at its core, the Court’s opinion in Davis held that 
“[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.”240 In contrast, “[t]hey are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such on-
going emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crim-
inal prosecution.”241 This framework essentially asks three questions: 
First, was the statement made in a police interrogation? Second, was 
there an ongoing emergency? Third, what was the primary purpose 
of the police interrogation? In addition, the Court settled the ques-
tion left ambiguously open in Crawford by holding that the Confron-
tation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay.242 If the hearsay is 
nontestimonial, then the Confrontation Clause does not apply, and 
no further analysis under Ohio v. Roberts and its progeny is re-
quired.243  
1.   Clearing the Testimonial Thicket 
 The first issue the Davis Court identified it “must decide” in order 
to resolve these cases is “whether the Confrontation Clause applies 
only to testimonial hearsay.”244 Noting that the rationale of Crawford 
certainly supported the conclusion that the Clause applies exclu-
sively to testimonial hearsay, the Davis Court acknowledged that the 
language in that opinion was not explicit.245 Therefore, in the interim 
period between Crawford and Davis, most courts cautiously applied a 
                                                                                                                     
 240. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. at 823-24.  
 243. Id. at 822; see also Duane, supra note 151, at 37. But see Kirkpatrick, supra note 
144 (arguing that although Crawford overruled Roberts with respect to testimonial hear-
say, its abandonment of protection against nontestimonial hearsay has raised concerns in 
confrontation jurisprudence). 
 244. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823. 
 245. Id. (“The answer to the [question whether the Confrontation Clause applies only 
to testimonial hearsay] was suggested in Crawford, even if not explicitly held . . . .”). 
 In response to the proposal that the Court revise the Confrontation Clause doctrine to 
apply the Clause to only testimonial statements, the Crawford Court indicated that it had 
previously considered this proposal in White v. Illinois and rejected it. Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 (2004) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992)). 
Admitting that the analysis in Crawford “casts doubt on that holding,” the Court ulti-
mately avoided ruling on the issue, stating “we need not definitively resolve whether it sur-
vives our decision today.” Id. at 61. While the Court commented that “even if the Sixth 
Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay,” it emphasized that “[testi-
monial hearsay] is its primary object.” Id. at 53. Further, the Court noted that the focus of 
the Clause on the evil of the civil-law mode of criminal procedure “also suggests that not 
all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.” Id. at 51. “Where nontesti-
monial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to . . . exempt[] 
such [hearsay] statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Id. at 68. 
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Roberts reliability analysis before admitting nontestimonial hearsay 
statements.246  
 In Davis, the Court reemphasized Crawford’s reliance on the dic-
tionary definition of “witnesses” as “those who ‘bear testimony,’ ”247 
and interpreted this textual limitation of the Sixth Amendment “to 
mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”248 Following this 
logic, the Court appeared to clarify that only testimonial hearsay is 
subject to the Confrontation Clause.249 The Court supported this in-
terpretation by reviewing the history of American cases that invoked 
the right to confrontation. The early American cases applied the Con-
frontation Clause only in the testimonial context.250 Later cases—
with one arguable exception in White v. Illinois251—also consistently 
required unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases involv-
ing testimonial hearsay.252 The Davis majority, albeit in a footnote, 
stated for the first time that it “overruled Roberts in Crawford by re-
storing the unavailability and cross-examination requirements.”253 
2.   Defining a “Police Interrogation” 
 In Davis, the Supreme Court began to articulate more compre-
hensive definitions of the two key terms it employed in Crawford to 
designate concepts essential to Confrontation Clause analysis: “tes-
timonial” and “interrogation.” Crawford held that the Sixth Amend-
ment barred “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who 
did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”254 
While the Crawford Court had explicitly deferred the challenge of 
                                                                                                                     
 246. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 247. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). “Testimony,” as defined 
by the dictionary used in Crawford, is “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 248. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824. 
 249. Id. at 821 (“Only [testimonial] statements . . . cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ 
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. It is the testimonial character of the 
statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limita-
tions upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
 250. See id. at 824-25. 
 251. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 252. Davis, 547 U.S. at 825. 
 253. Id. at 825 n.4.; cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring with the judgment). Nevertheless, there was debate and disagreement 
over whether or how Davis answered this question. See Duane, supra note 151 (claiming 
that Davis completely overruled Roberts). But see Raeder, supra note 144, at 16 (noting the 
discussion of the Roberts reliability test in Davis was in dictum and not necessary to the 
holding). In Wharton v. Bockting, the issue was finally put to rest when the Court con-
firmed it intended to overrule Roberts in Crawford. 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1179 (2007) (holding 
that Crawford did not apply retroactively on collateral review); see also Kirkpatrick, supra 
note 144. 
 254. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. 
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comprehensively defining “testimonial,”255 it found that “some state-
ments qualify [as testimonial] under any definition” including 
“[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interroga-
tions.”256 
 First, the Davis Court summarily resolved the issue of whether 
only sworn law enforcement officers qualify as “police” for purposes of 
“police interrogation” under Confrontation Clause analysis. The 
Court reasoned that even if 911 operators were not “law enforcement 
officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they 
conduct interrogations of 911 callers.”257 The Court considered “their 
acts to be acts of the police” only for purposes of the Davis opinion.258 
Attempting to reemphasize the limitation of this conclusion, the 
Court stated that it is proceeding in this manner “without deciding 
the point.”259  
 Next, the Davis Court considered the definition of “interrogation.” 
The Crawford Court suggested that “[j]ust as various definitions of 
‘testimonial’ exist, one can imagine various definitions of ‘interroga-
tion,’ and we need not select among them in this case.”260 Even 
though Sylvia’s statement was taken under conditions that would 
constitute a custodial interrogation in a technical legal sense under a 
Fifth Amendment Miranda analysis,261 the Court implicitly author-
ized other courts to expand the interpretation to other instances of 
police questioning that might also qualify as interrogations that in-
voke the Confrontation Clause. The Court commented that it was 
“us[ing] the term ‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than any 
technical legal, sense.”262  
 The Davis Court clearly indicated that formality of the question-
ing was an essential but not determinative factor in objectively 
evaluating the circumstances of the declarant’s statements.263 Quot-
                                                                                                                     
 255. Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive defini-
tion of ‘testimonial.’ ”). 
 256. Id. at 52. 
 257. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2.  
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. The Court unanimously agreed on this point. See id. at 837 n.1 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (presuming “the acts of the 911 opera-
tor to be the acts of the police”). 
 260. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
 261. Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Davis, 547 U.S. at 831 n.5 (“We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to 
testimonial utterance.”). 
In any event, we do not think it conceivable that the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking po-
liceman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of 
having the declarant sign a deposition. Indeed, if there is one point for 
which no case—English or early American, state or federal—can be cited, 
that is it. 
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ing the definition of “testimony” used in Crawford,264 the Davis Court 
reinforced Crawford’s position that, while formality must be consid-
ered, a solemn declaration could be uttered outside of a formal judi-
cial proceeding. Responding to the dissent’s criticism that the pri-
mary purpose test was not “ ‘a targeted attempt to reach the abuses 
forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause,’ ” the majority chided the 
dissent for the futility of overemphasizing the historical origins of the 
right.265 Justice Scalia, who heavily relied on the historical origin and 
purpose of the Clause in justifying the drastic change of course in 
Crawford, stated that “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the 
precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for 
its extinction.”266 
 The Court looked back to English cases for support that the right 
of confrontation is not limited to only the types of formal statements 
to which most American cases have applied the right, such as sworn 
testimony from prior judicial proceedings and formal sworn deposi-
tions.267 There are two ways of interpreting this history. First, one 
                                                                                                                     
Id. at 826. 
 264. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
 265. Id. at 830 n.5 (alteration in original).  
 266. Id. at 830-31 n.5. As the Court states: 
     The dissent criticizes our test for being “neither workable nor a targeted 
attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause.” As 
to the former: We have acknowledged that our holding is not an “exhaus-
tive classification of all conceivable statements—or even all conceivable 
statements in response to police interrogation,” but rather a resolution of 
the cases before us and those like them. For those cases, the test is objec-
tive and quite “workable.” The dissent, in attempting to formulate an ex-
haustive classification of its own, has not provided anything that deserves 
the description “workable”—unless one thinks that the distinction between 
“formal” and “informal” statements qualifies. And the dissent even quali-
fies that vague distinction by acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause 
“also reaches the use of technically informal statements when used to 
evade the formalized process” and cautioning that the Clause would stop 
the State from “us[ing] out-of-court statements as a means of circumvent-
ing the literal right of confrontation.” It is hard to see this as much more 
“predictable” than the rule we adopt for the narrow situations we ad-
dress. . . . 
     As for the charge that our holding is not a “targeted attempt to reach 
the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause,” which the dissent de-
scribes as the depositions taken by Marian magistrates, characterized by a 
high degree of formality: We do not dispute that formality is indeed essen-
tial to testimonial utterance. But we no longer have examining Marian 
magistrates; and we do have, as our 18th-century forebears did not, exam-
ining police officers who perform investigative and testimonial functions 
once performed by examining Marian magistrates. It imports sufficient 
formality, in our view, that lies to such officers are criminal offenses. Re-
stricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it 
was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
 267. Id. at 825-26 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 & n.3); cf. id. at 836-37 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In support of his view that for-
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could interpret the shift in the American cases as an implicit depar-
ture from the English approach. Second, one could view as mere co-
incidence the fact that American cases involved only formal state-
ments with no intent to depart from the English approach. The Davis 
Court chose the latter interpretation and refused to infer from the 
absence of American cases that involve less formality that any limi-
tation had been created in American confrontation jurisprudence.268 
The Court reasoned that just as the oath and the threat of perjury 
render courtroom statements solemn, the criminal consequences of 
lying to law enforcement render responses to police interrogation sol-
emn and sufficiently formal.269 
3.   Towards a New Objective Approach: The “Primary Purpose” 
Test 
 In Davis, the Court set out “to determine more precisely which po-
lice interrogations produce testimony.”270 Consistent with the incre-
mental approach the Court set forth in Crawford, the Davis Court 
tried to narrowly limit its holding to the facts of the cases before it by 
issuing the caveat that it was not “attempting to produce an exhaus-
tive classification of all conceivable statements . . . in response to po-
lice interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial.”271 
 Sylvia’s statements in Crawford qualified as a police interrogation 
that produced testimonial statements subject to the Confrontation 
Clause “under any conceivable definition.”272 For emphasis, the Davis 
                                                                                                                     
mality is the key, Justice Thomas indicated that nearly all of the early American and re-
cent cases invoking the right to confrontation or the Confrontation Clause involved evi-
dence within this narrower category of formalized testimonial materials. Id. at 837. 
 268. See id. at 826 (majority opinion). 
 269. Id. at 826-27 (citing United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 288 (2d Cir. 2006); 
State v. Reed, 695 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Wis. 2005)); see also id. at 831 n.5 (“It imports suffi-
cient formality, in our view, that lies to such officers are criminal offenses.”). In his dissent, 
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s position that the potential legal conse-
quences for making a false statement to a police officer are sufficient to make the state-
ment “solemn or formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms,” id. at 838 n.3 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), asserting that generally, re-
sponses to informal police questioning lack “sufficient indicia of solemnity” to render them 
testimonial. Id. (Thomas, J. concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 270. Id. at 822 (majority opinion). While the Davis Court examined the application of 
the Confrontation Clause to statements made during police interrogations, it is not neces-
sary that a statement be given in response to a question for it to be regulated by the Con-
frontation Clause. Id. at 822-23 n.1. In other words, the Court limited its holding to police 
interrogations only because the two cases before the Court involved police interrogations, 
not because the Court intended to limit the interpretation of testimonial statements to re-
sponses to interrogations. 
 271. Id. at 822. Clearly, the applicability of the primary purpose test is limited to police 
interrogations and does little to inform courts about the testimonial nature of statements 
in other contexts. 
 272. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
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Court even referred to Sylvia as a “deponent.”273 It was a closer issue 
whether the questions of the 911 operator to Michelle McCottry or of 
the responding officer to Amy Hammon qualified as police interroga-
tions that produced testimonial statements.274 
 The Court then constructed a general analytical framework that 
declared that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indi-
cating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable po-
lice assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”275 In contrast, “[t]hey 
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that 
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially rele-
vant to later criminal prosecution.”276  
 The Davis Court elaborated on the Crawford decision by charac-
terizing Sylvia’s interrogation as one that was “solely directed at es-
tablishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide 
evidence to convict) the perpetrator.”277 The Davis Court then set 
forth a lower, “primary purpose” standard, suggesting that more var-
ied circumstances of police questioning could qualify as police inter-
rogations that produce testimonial statements.278 
 In essence, the evaluation asks whether the officer is acting like a 
prosecutor asking questions on direct examination “to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” 
or like a rescue worker getting information “to enable police assis-
tance to meet an ongoing emergency.”279 Fundamentally, a trial court 
must look at the circumstances of the communication and determine 
why the police are asking questions or why the declarant is speaking 
to the police. Notwithstanding the Court’s claim that the inquiry is 
focused on “the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s ques-
tions,”280 the opinion also repeatedly referred to whether the ques-
tioner’s conduct can generate or produce testimonial statements.281 
 A trial court must determine the officer’s primary purpose by ob-
jectively evaluating the circumstances in which the statements are 
                                                                                                                     
 273. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (8th ed. 2004) (de-
fining “deponent” as “1. One who testifies by deposition. 2. A witness who gives written tes-
timony for later use in court; affiant”).  
 274. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 275. Id. (emphasis added).  
 276. Id. at 822 (emphasis added). By emphasizing objectivity, the Court may be seek-
ing to avoid the potential difficulty in determining the subjective mental state of either the 
police or the declarant. 
 277. Id. at 826 (emphasis added). 
 278. Id. at 828-29.  
 279. Id. at 822. 
 280. Id. at 823 n.1. 
 281. See id. at 822, 822-23  n.1, 826.  
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made.282 The objective approach adopted by the Court increases the 
utility of the primary purpose test because an objective consideration 
of all the factors ensures that any one circumstance does not control 
the outcome. As a result, many incentives for the police to manipu-
late the circumstances are diminished. Neither the declarant’s loca-
tion nor the stage of investigation will by itself determine the testi-
monial character of the statement.283 The Court recognized that the 
Confrontation Clause is not aimed at regulating police conduct, and 
police conduct cannot alter the trial court’s later determination re-
garding the character of the hearsay statement.284 A defendant’s 
rights are not violated by the state’s method of evidence collection 
but by the state’s use of the evidence at trial without demonstrating 
the unavailability of the declarant and giving the defendant the op-
portunity for cross-examination.285 
 (a)   Applying the Primary Purpose Test to Davis 
 To apply the primary purpose analytical framework to the facts of 
Davis, the Court evaluated four factors to determine “whether, objec-
tively considered, the interrogation that took place in the course of 
the 911 call produced testimonial statements.”286 This list of factors 
does not appear to be a comprehensive list. Rather, it included as-
pects of comparison that highlight some of the differences between 
the circumstances of Davis and Crawford. 
 The first point of comparison was the timing of the questioning 
relative to the events described by the declarant. Sylvia Crawford’s 
statements to the officers were made hours after the stabbing.287 In 
contrast, McCottry was telling the 911 operator about events “as they 
were actually happening, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events.’ ”288 
Next, the Court considered whether there were circumstances objec-
                                                                                                                     
 282. Id. at 822. While the Court repeatedly expressed that the primary purpose test is 
an objective evaluation, the Court continued to use the subjective perspective of the officer 
to bolster its conclusion. For example, the Court fortified its determination that Amy 
Hammon’s statements to the officer were testimonial because the interrogating officer ex-
pressly acknowledged that his purpose was to investigate past criminal conduct. Id. at 829 
(citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 25, 32, 34). Similarly, Amy’s affidavit was tes-
timonial because the officer testified that the purpose of the document is “ ‘[t]o establish 
events that have occurred previously.’ ” Id. at 832 (Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, 
at 18). 
 283. Id. at 832. 
 284. Id. at 832 n.6. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 826. 
 287. Id. at 827. 
 288. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)). 
Justice Thomas disagreed with this characterization of the statements. Id. at 841 n.6 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Similarly, ‘the events 
described [by McCottry] were over’ by the time she recounted them to the 911 operator.” 
(alteration in original)). 
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tively indicating the existence of an ongoing emergency involving 
imminent danger.289 Unlike Sylvia, who was safely in police custody, 
McCottry “was facing an ongoing emergency” because she was still 
alone at the scene of the alleged crime and unprotected by the po-
lice.290 The Court determined that “McCottry’s call was plainly a call 
for help against bona fide physical threat”291 because she was “appar-
ently in immediate danger from Davis.”292 The Court concluded that 
“[s]he was seeking aid” and that her use of “present-tense statements 
showed immediacy.”293 Endorsing the Indiana Supreme Court’s view 
that nontestimonial statements can “ ‘evolve into testimonial state-
ments’ ” when the purpose of the interrogation is no longer to enable 
police assistance to meet the ongoing emergency,294 the Court 
strongly suggested that the duration of an ongoing emergency should 
be narrowly construed.295 
 The third inquiry considered whether, objectively viewed, “the na-
ture of what was asked and answered . . . was such that the elicited 
statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emer-
gency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had hap-
pened in the past.”296 The Court characterized Sylvia Crawford’s in-
terrogation as one that was “solely directed at establishing the facts 
of a past crime.”297 By contrast, the Court observed that “at least the 
initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordi-
narily not designed primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact, 
but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”298 
On the facts of Davis, the Court found that questions establishing 
the identity of the assailant were necessary to resolve the present 
emergency because the responding officers needed the information to 
assess the dangerousness of the situation they would encounter.299 
                                                                                                                     
 289. Id. at 826-27 (majority opinion). Interestingly, the Court adopted the limited per-
spective of the recipient of the statement rather than considering all of the relevant cir-
cumstances by noting that “any reasonable listener would recognize that McCottry . . . was 
facing an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 827. 
 290. Id. at 827, 831-32. 
 291. Id. at 827. 
 292. Id. at 831. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 828 (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005)).  
 295. Id. at 829. For example, the Court suggested that the emergency may have ex-
pired the moment that Davis left the premises. Id. at 828. This portion of the call is only 
the beginning one-third of the redacted call. The Court cagily indicates that Davis’s jury 
“may well have heard some testimonial portions” but avoids actually determining if and 
when the 911 call evolved into an interrogation producing testimonial statements. Id. at 
829. Nevertheless, the Court confidently asserted that this determination “presents no 
great problem” because “trial courts will recognize the point at which . . . statements in re-
sponse to interrogations become testimonial.” Id. 
 296. Id. at 827. 
 297. Id. at 826 (emphasis added). 
 298. Id. at 827 (alteration in original). 
 299. Id. 
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Lastly, the Court examined the formality of the questioning.300 The 
Court found a striking difference between the formality of Sylvia 
Crawford’s calm station house interview and the informality of 
McCottry’s “frantic” 911 call.301 
 Objectively considering all these circumstances, the Court con-
cluded that the primary purpose of McCottry’s interrogation “was to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”302 In sum-
mation, the Court considered the overall character of her statement 
and found that it “was not ‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at 
trial.”303 In effect, the statements did not do what a witness does on 
direct examination. The Court illustrated this concept by suggesting 
that “[n]o ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek 
help.”304 
 (b)   Applying the “Primary Purpose” Test to Hammon 
 Applying the primary purpose test to the facts of Hammon proved 
an “easier task” for the Court.305 Finding the circumstances to be 
similar to those in Crawford and dissimilar to those in Davis,306 the 
Court dispensed with the first three factors quickly. First, Amy’s 
statements were made after, not during, the events she described.307 
Second, given that the interrogating officer “heard no arguments or 
crashing and saw no one throw or break anything,”308 the Court con-
cluded that these circumstances objectively indicated “there was no 
emergency in progress.”309 Unlike McCottry—who was alone, unpro-
tected by the police, and in apparent immediate danger from Davis—
Amy Hammon made her statement when she was protected by the 
police. Because Amy told the officers when they arrived “that things 
were fine,”310 the Court found “no immediate threat to her person.”311 
These conclusions rendered consideration of the third factor unneces-
sary—without an ongoing emergency, the elicited statements were 
clearly not necessary for the police “to resolve the present emer-
                                                                                                                     
 300. Id. at 827. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 828. 
 303. Id. (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 829. Both the majority and Justice Thomas agreed that the affidavit Amy 
completed after the police questioning was testimonial and admitted in error. Id. at 834; 
id. at 840 n.5 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 306. Id. at 831 (majority opinion). 
 307. Id. at 829-30. “When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited 
the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) ‘what is happen-
ing,’ but rather ‘what happened.’ ” Id. at 830. 
 308. Id. at 829 (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 25). 
 309. Id. (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 25). 
 310. Id. at 830 (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 25). 
 311. Id.  
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gency.” 312  
 Finally, the Court conceded there was a difference between the 
formality of the interrogations in Hammon and Crawford. In Craw-
ford, the interrogation “followed a Miranda warning, was tape-
recorded, and took place at the station house.”313 In Hammon, the 
“interrogation was conducted in a separate room, away from her 
husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer receiving her re-
plies for use in his ‘investigat[ion].’ ”314 While the comparatively for-
mal circumstances of Crawford’s interview “made it more objectively 
apparent” that the statements were testimonial, the Court deter-
mined that Amy’s interrogation “was formal enough.”315  
 Highlighting a few similarities, the Court set civil-law ex parte 
examinations, the in-custody interrogation of Sylvia Crawford, and 
the responding officer’s questioning of Amy Hammon on equal 
ground.316 “Both declarants were actively separated from the defen-
dant[,] . . . [b]oth statements deliberately recounted, in response to 
police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and 
progressed and both took place some time after the events described 
were over.”317 The Court concluded that it was entirely clear that the 
circumstances objectively indicated the primary purpose of the inter-
view was to investigate possible past criminal conduct.318 In sum, the 
Court characterized these statements as “obvious substitute[s] for 
live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on di-
rect examination.”319  
C.   Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
 Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part, concluded that neither declarants’ statements in Davis 
and Hammon were testimonial320 because neither statement was a 
                                                                                                                     
 312. Id. at 827. 
 313. Id. at 830 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004)). 
 314. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 34).  
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. (“What we called the ‘striking resemblance’ of the Crawford statement to civil-
law ex parte examinations is shared by Amy’s statement here.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 317. Id.   
 318. Id. Justice Thomas disagreed with a court’s ability to discern the primary purpose 
of an interrogation from these circumstances. The Court had distinguished the facts of Da-
vis from those of Hammon and Crawford to reach opposite conclusions regarding the tes-
timonial character of the declarants’ statements. In his dissent, Justice Thomas demon-
strated that the facts were actually more similar than different. For example, McCottry 
was also separated from defendant Davis when she was speaking to the 911 operator. Id. 
at 841 n.6. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Also, 
like the declarants in Crawford and Hammon whose statements were made after the 
events took place, McCottry also described in her statement events that were over. Id. at 
829-30 (majority opinion).  
 319. Id. at 830. 
 320. Id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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formalized dialogue taken under circumstances similar to those in 
Crawford.321 Furthermore, there was no indication that the prosecu-
tion was offering the hearsay evidence in bad  faith “in order to evade 
confrontation.”322 
 By focusing on formality, Justice Thomas was primarily concerned 
with the state’s opportunity to corrupt the integrity of the evidence 
rather than the potential benefits that providing a procedural right 
to the defendant may have on enhancing the truth-finding process. 
Given that governmental abuses historically have resulted in formal 
statements, allowing the defendant to confront those formalized 
statements would appropriately target the governmental abuse. 
While a bright-line standard based on formality may simplify the 
analysis, the relative ease in judicial application does not further the 
ultimate goal of pursuing truth and fairness.  
 Justice Thomas disagreed with both the majority’s method and 
scope in Davis. He criticized the majority’s primary purpose test for 
having the same flaws as the Roberts reliability analysis: it did not 
fulfill either of Crawford’s goals of making Confrontation analysis 
more focused on the abuses forbidden by the Clause or more predict-
able.323 Justice Thomas characterized the scope of the primary pur-
pose test as overbroad and not appropriately targeted “to reach the 
abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause,”324 “namely, the 
‘civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused.’ ”325 
 Further, Justice Thomas argued the test was not workable be-
cause it reverted Confrontation analysis back to an inherently un-
predictable test.326 The Crawford Court criticized and abandoned the 
Roberts test largely because it was “ ‘inherently, and therefore per-
manently, unpredictable.’ ”327 Claiming that it would be as difficult 
for trial courts to apply a primary purpose test as it was to apply a 
reliability test, Justice Thomas argued that the results would be 
                                                                                                                     
 321. Id. Additionally, neither statement resembled the formality of the Marian exami-
nations. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 834. 
 324. Id. at 842. Justice Thomas asserts that the historical origin of the Confrontation 
Clause supported the conclusion that its reach was limited to prevent abuses of the gov-
ernment. Justice Thomas examined how closely a particular procedure resembles the abu-
sive inquisitorial practices of the Marian bail and committal statutes that gave rise to the 
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 835-36. 
 325. Id. at 835 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43, 50 (2004); White v. Il-
linois, 502 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mattox v. United States, 156 
U.S. 237, 242 (1895)). 
 326. Id. at 841-42. The majority responds that “the test is objective and quite ‘worka-
ble’ ” for “the cases before [the Court] and those like them.” Id. at 831 n.5 (majority opin-
ion).  
 327. Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10). 
772  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:729 
 
equally unpredictable.328 He noted that “[i]n many, if not most, cases 
where police respond to a report of a crime . . . , the purposes of an 
interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to 
respond to the emergency situation and to gather evidence.”329 Jus-
tice Thomas doubted that in many cases one purpose is primary to 
the other, and even if it were, he doubted that courts could reliably 
discern which purpose was primary.330  
 Justice Thomas illustrated how the circumstances in Davis and 
Hammon indicated both purposes of an interrogation. Even though 
the officer was investigating Herchel’s past conduct, it is also possi-
ble that the officer was primarily assessing “whether Mr. Hammon 
constituted a continuing danger to his wife, requiring further police 
presence or action.”331 While there were no observable circumstances 
showing that Herschel was in the process of causing physical harm to 
his wife, other circumstances that could demonstrate an ongoing 
emergency may not have been immediately apparent while the offi-
cers were present. It was possible “his violence would have resumed 
had the police left without further questioning.”332 Similarly, even 
though McCottry apparently needed emergency help, it was also pos-
sible the 911 operator was asking questions about the identity of the 
alleged assailant primarily to establish past events potentially rele-
vant to later criminal prosecution.  
 Instead of the primary purpose approach, Justice Thomas advo-
cated a standard that focused on the formality of the statement.333 
Beginning in White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas has consistently pro-
posed that “statements regulated by the Confrontation Clause must 
include ‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testi-
monial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.’ ”334 The procedure for procuring affidavits, depositions, 
                                                                                                                     
 328. Id. at 834. According to Justice Thomas, the unpredictable results will hamper 
“police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law.” Id. at 838. 
 329. Id. at 839. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 841. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Using Crawford’s definitions of “witnesses” and “testimony,” Justice Thomas ad-
vocated that “the plain terms of the ‘testimony’ definition . . . necessarily require some de-
gree of solemnity.” Id. at 836. He then translated the requirement of solemn declaration to 
formalized testimonial material. Id. 
 334. Id. (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment)) (ellipses in original) (emphasis added).  
     In White, Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s concurrence that promoted changes to 
untangle the constitutional right to confrontation from evidentiary hearsay rules in an ef-
fort to be more consistent with the text and history of the Clause. White, 502 U.S. at 358 
(Thomas, J., concurring). In Crawford, this is precisely what Scalia did. But this narrow 
definition of formal testimonial statements was only one of the three “formulations of [the] 
core class of ‘testimonial’ statements” set forth in Crawford. Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. at 36, 51 (2004). Ultimately, in Davis, Scalia completely departed from the position he 
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and prior testimony is clearly formal because all are sworn state-
ments given for use in judicial proceedings. Confessions, however, 
are not necessarily solemn or formal. Recognizing that various pro-
cedures may be used to procure confessions, Justice Thomas found 
that only those confessions that are “extracted by police in a formal 
manner” are sufficiently solemn to be characterized as testimonial.335 
Similarly, conversations between the police and witnesses or sus-
pects are solemn declarations only when they “are somehow ren-
dered ‘formal.’ ”336  
 However, the majority was concerned that if the application of the 
Confrontation Clause depended only on the formality of the process 
in which the statements were taken, then the state could easily avoid 
formality in order to evade the Clause.337 Under such a standard, the 
police would have the incentive to modify their investigatory prac-
tices to collect witness statements in the most informal manner. To 
address this valid concern,338 Justice Thomas created a narrow excep-
tion to a rule based on formality for “technically informal statements 
when used to evade the formalized process.”339 Assuming this issue 
would arise less frequently than the issues in the primary purpose 
test, Justice Thomas promoted his analysis as simplifying the appli-
cation of the Clause.340  
 Despite Justice Thomas’s split from the majority, the justices all 
shared the common goal of creating a criminal justice system that 
produces accurate results within a procedural system that is fair and 
able to function within all the practical constraints of time and re-
                                                                                                                     
had joined in White and explicitly rejected any limitation imposed by formality. Davis, 547 
U.S. at 826. (majority opinion) (“In any event, we do not think it conceivable that the pro-
tections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking police-
man recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant 
sign a deposition. Indeed, if there is one point for which no case—English or early Ameri-
can, state or federal—can be cited, that is it.”). 
 335. Id. at 837 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
Confessions that are “extracted by police in a formal manner . . . bear a ‘striking resem-
blance’ to the examinations of the accused and accusers under the Marian statutes. Id. (in-
ternal citations omitted).  
 336. Id.  
 337. Id. at 826 (majority opinion). 
 338. Justice Thomas concedes that this result would be detrimental to the criminal jus-
tice system. Id. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 339. Id. The scope of this exception is aimed at the abusive prosecutorial practices that 
resemble the particular abuses targeted by the Confrontation Clause, unlike the “need-
lessly overinclusive” primary purpose test. Id. 
 340. Id. While Justice Thomas’s exception addresses unfair manipulation by the police 
and prosecution, it raises another difficult issue: trial courts would need to decipher the in-
tent of the prosecution to determine whether it was offering evidence in good or bad faith. 
The majority’s approach draws on a wider range of circumstances in characterizing the tes-
timonial nature of a declarant’s statement during a police investigation. Given that many 
of these circumstances are “essentially beyond police control[,] . . . [t]he Confrontation 
Clause in no way governs police conduct.” Id. at 832 n.6 (majority opinion). 
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sources. However, both the majority and the dissent in Davis strug-
gled with the desire to create clear guidelines for theoretical consis-
tency and ease of application on the one hand and the desire to cau-
tiously decide the case before it so that its holding does not inadver-
tently create precedent that is inflexible to unforeseen circumstances 
on the other. Each recognizes that the other’s approach is overbroad 
in some areas, underinclusive in others, and difficult to administer. 
While a broad, bright-line rule may be too rigid or blunt to ade-
quately address various future cases, a narrow holding limited spe-
cifically to the facts does not provide sufficient useful guidance 
to courts. 
 Notwithstanding similarities on these broader principles, the Jus-
tices’ perspectives on procedure differ based in part on which element 
of a trial they perceive to be the most untrustworthy. In other words, 
they differ fundamentally on where within the system they choose to 
emphasize distrust. The Davis majority is skeptical about the credi-
bility of a hearsay declarant. On the other hand, Justice Thomas ap-
pears to lack confidence in the courts and the state.341 The parties 
also differ on which aspects of the system are most problematic in a 
search for the truth. The defense in Davis distrusted the credibility 
of both the hearsay declarant and the testifying witness.342 The 
prosecution contends that the system is flawed only when the gov-
ernment has the opportunity to be abusive in the manners in which 
it has historically been abusive or when probative evidence is ex-
cluded. 
IV.   CONFRONTING THE ONGOING RELATIONSHIP 
 Together, Crawford and Davis challenge courts to develop a prin-
cipled jurisprudence for reconciling the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence with the Confrontation Clause. Although the Court made sub-
stantial progress in Davis towards clearing the testimonial thicket, 
important unresolved issues remain. For example, even though the 
Court analyzed two domestic violence scenarios in Davis, the Court 
failed to give clear guidance on how lower courts should assess ad-
missibility issues in contexts in which the defendant and the decla-
rant are involved in an ongoing relationship. This Part begins by 
highlighting how the psychology and sociology of certain relation-
                                                                                                                     
 341. For example, Justice Thomas appears to be primarily concerned with the oppor-
tunity of the state to corrupt the integrity of the evidence rather than the provision of a 
procedural right, regardless of the positive effect that the procedure may have on enhanc-
ing the truth-finding process. See supra Part III.C. 
 342.  However, the defense did not address the inaccuracy of a statement due to the in-
completeness of detail or ambiguity of word choice, because these problems also exist in ex-
trajudicial statements to nongovernmental actors or statements to unknown govern-
ment agents.  
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ships present problems for courts. After discussing the broader goals 
of the criminal justice system, this Part presents an approach courts 
can use in interpreting Davis that respects these goals in addressing 
cases with problem relationships.  
A.   Identifying Problematic Relationships 
 After Crawford, many cases in which the prosecution had suffi-
cient evidence to proceed at trial under the pre-Crawford confronta-
tion framework were dismissed. Essential evidence was rendered in-
admissible because the declarant’s out-of-court statements were 
deemed testimonial and the defendant lacked the opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant. For example, many domestic violence 
cases were dismissed because the victim was absent from trial.343 
This drastic change in the ability to prosecute some crimes raises se-
rious concerns about the inadvertent impact of allowing factually 
guilty defendants to avoid criminal conviction.  
1.   A Relational Approach 
 Certain types of cases commonly present witness-availability 
problems for the prosecution because of the relationship between the 
defendant and the witness. The dynamics of many defendant-witness 
relationships can powerfully impact the witness’s willingness to par-
ticipate in the criminal process. In the context of domestic violence, 
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer has presented a useful framework 
for understanding the special concerns that arise when the defendant 
and the declarant-witness have an ongoing relationship.344 Professor 
Tuerkheimer describes the complex triangular “relationships be-
tween accuser, state, and accused”345 and how they frequently hinder 
domestic violence prosecution. Generally, the interests of a prosecu-
                                                                                                                     
 343. As Professor Tom Lininger starkly described the impact:  
Indeed, within days—even hours—of the Crawford decision, prosecutors 
were dismissing or losing hundreds of domestic violence cases that would 
have presented little difficulty in the past. For example, during the sum-
mer of 2004, half of the domestic violence cases set for trial in Dallas 
County, Texas, were dismissed because of evidentiary problems un-
der Crawford.  
     In a survey of over 60 prosecutors’ offices in California, Oregon, and 
Washington, 63 percent of respondents reported the Crawford decision has 
significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence. Seventy-six per-
cent indicated that after Crawford, their offices are more likely to drop 
domestic violence charges when the victims recant or refuse to cooperate. 
Alarmingly, 65 percent of respondents reported that victims of domestic vi-
olence are less safe in their jurisdictions than during the era preceding the 
Crawford decision. 
Lininger, supra note 8, at 749-50 (footnotes omitted).  
 344. Tuerkheimer, supra note 8. 
 345. Id. at 10. 
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tion witness are either neutral or aligned with the state against the 
defendant. In contrast, the interests of the accuser in domestic vio-
lence cases may often be aligned with the defendant against the 
state. Professor Tuerkheimer conceptualizes these relationships as a 
triangle and urges courts to adopt a “relational approach” to Confron-
tation Clause analysis in domestic violence prosecutions.346 The rela-
tional approach considers the dynamics of abuse and the context of 
the relationship between the victim and the defendant.347  
 The ongoing relationship between the defendant and the victim is 
problematic for the state to the extent that it “causes the expressed 
interests of victims and law enforcement to diverge.”348 For example, 
a victim may decline to cooperate with the prosecution by “re-
cant[ing] her allegations, refus[ing] to testify, effectively disap-
pear[ing], or simply articulate[ing] her desire not to ‘press 
charges.’ ”349  
 In domestic violence prosecutions, the relationship between the 
victim and the state, as witness and prosecutor, is problematic for the 
defendant simply because it puts him at risk for criminal sanction 
and deprives him of some of the power he typically has over the vic-
tim. The relationship between the state and the defendant may be 
problematic for the victim because it may put her at more risk of 
harm because of the defendant’s reaction to law enforcement inter-
vention or because of the consequences of the prosecution. Citing 
various reasons for a victim’s noncooperation, Professor Tuerkheimer 
convincingly demonstrates how these reasons are “rooted in the con-
tinuing relationship between the woman and the defendant.”350 For 
example, the victims may “fear greater violence if they cooperated; . . 
. still love the batterer and . . . not want him to suffer; . . . need his fi-
nancial support; [or] . . . want their children to have a father in 
the home.”351  
 The Davis Court expressly acknowledged the extraordinary chal-
lenges raised by domestic violence cases, noting that “[t]his particu-
lar type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion 
of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at trial. When this 
occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a windfall.”352 
While the Court declined to create a different constitutional standard 
altogether for domestic violence crimes, the Court cautioned that de-
                                                                                                                     
 346. Id. at 7, 10. 
 347. Id. at 7. 
 348. Id. at 14. 
 349. Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted). 
 350. Id. at 17. 
 351. Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted). 
 352. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832-33 (2006). 
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fendants may not “undermine the judicial process” and “destroy the 
integrity of the criminal-trial system.”353 
 However, domestic violence cases are hardly unique. The same 
shifting dynamics between accuser, accused, and state can be found 
in other contexts. For example, as has recently been chronicled in the 
popular press, in gang cases the accuser may be a fellow gang mem-
ber, a rival gang member, or a member of the community where 
gangs have significant power and control.354 While the accuser may 
need law enforcement intervention to prevent serious harm caused 
by the accused gang member, the accused gang member’s relation-
ship with the accuser may cause the accuser’s interests to diverge 
from those of the state. The gang member defendant or the defen-
dant’s fellow gang members have the power to threaten serious 
harm, thus intimidating the witness into not cooperating with the 
state in the prosecution. Similarly, in the culture of a business or 
corporation, employees may be intimidated into silence by employers 
who have engaged in wrongdoing, echoing many of the characteris-
tics of gang culture.355 In both gangs and some business cultures, loy-
alty to the organization and hierarchy within the organization are 
strong forces that impact the relationships of the members of the or-
ganization. As a result, a member may be reluctant to accuse another 
of criminal wrongdoing. If the accusation is made, the relationship 
between the accused and the accuser may cause risk of serious harm 
to the accuser’s welfare such that the accuser is not willing to coop-
erate with the state. For example, the accuser’s economic welfare 
may be at serious risk if participation in the prosecution causes the 
accuser to lose employment.  
2.   Applying the Relational Approach to the Facts of Hammon 
 The case of Amy Hammon itself illustrates how the dynamics of 
the relationship between the defendant and the witness-declarant is 
in tension with the witness-declarant’s relationship with the state. 
When law enforcement officers arrived at the Hammons’ home in re-
sponse to “a reported domestic disturbance,”356 they found Amy on 
                                                                                                                     
 353. Id. at 833. 
 354. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Suspects Go Free, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at A1; David Kocieniewski, A Little Girl Shot, and a Crowd That 
Didn’t See, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A1.  
 355. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate 
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 441 (2004) (arguing that the “contrast between the be-
havior of the executives, board members, and corporate advisors who were reluctant to 
challenge the corporate misbehavior, and the small number of corporate whistleblowers 
who did, points to a disturbing social psychological reality that has been overlooked in the 
discussion and reforms addressing the corporate scandals: namely, a group dynamic that 
binds group members together and blinds them to their failings and abuses”). 
 356. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005). 
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the front porch of her house appearing “timid and frightened.”357 An 
officer asked Amy if “there ‘was a problem and if anything was going 
on.’ ” Amy answered “no,”358 and said “ ‘nothing was the matter’ and 
that ‘everything was okay.’ ”359 At this point, Amy’s interests seem 
more aligned with Herschel’s because her statements appear aimed 
at keeping the police away in order to protect her husband. The offi-
cer continued to inquire despite Amy’s answer because he “didn’t feel 
safe leaving the premises when we were responding to a call of a 
fight due to her state of frighteness [sic].”360 
 When Amy gave permission, the police entered the house and no-
ticed “the living room was in ‘disarray’ ”361  and the gas heating unit 
was broken.362 Hershel Hammon was in the kitchen.363 Hershel ad-
mitted “that he and his wife had ‘been in an argument’ but ‘every-
thing was fine now’ and the argument ‘never became physical.’ ”364 
“One of the officers remained with Hershel; the other went to the liv-
ing room to talk with Amy . . . .”365 At this time, Hershel’s interests 
were already opposed to the state’s interests.  
 When separated from Hershel, Amy’s interests appeared to be-
come either more neutral or more aligned with those of the state. Af-
ter the officer “ ‘again asked [her] what had occurred,’ ”366 he 
testified that Amy “informed [him] that she and Hershel had been 
in an argument. That [Hershel] became irrate [sic] over the fact of 
their daughter going to a boyfriend’s house. The argument became 
. . . physical after being verbal and she informed [him] that Mr. 
Hammon, during the verbal part of the argument was breaking 
things in the living room and [he] believe[d] she stated he broke 
the phone, broke the lamp, broke the front of the heater. When it 
became physical he threw her down into the glass of the heater.367 
At trial, the officer testified that “[Amy] ‘informed me Mr. Hammon 
had pushed her onto the ground, had shoved her head into the bro-
                                                                                                                     
 357. Id.  
 358. Id.   
 359. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447.  
 360. Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 25. “I didn’t know if someone had told her to 
tell them everything was okay and that everything actually wasn’t. It’s my job to investi-
gate further than just the beginning realms.” Id.  
 361. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 948 (quoting Trial Transcript at 10, Hammon, 809 
N.E.2d 945 (No. 52A02-0308-CR-693)). 
 362. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819 (2006) (citing Hammon Appendix, supra 
note 24, at 16). 
 363. Id.  
 364. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447. 
 365. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819. 
 366. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447. 
 367. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819 (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 17-18). 
2008]           CONFRONTING THE “ONGOING EMERGENCY” 779 
 
ken glass of the heater and that he had punched her in the chest 
twice I believe.’ ”368 
 While the officer was talking with Amy, Hershel tried at least 
twice to enter the living room,369 and when he entered, the officer ob-
served that Amy “would become quiet, almost afraid to speak at that 
time.”370 Amy’s reaction demonstrates her understanding that her co-
operation with the police was contributing to potentially negative 
consequences for Hershel and, in turn, for herself. Hershel “ ‘became 
angry when [the officer] insisted that [he] stay separated from Mrs. 
Hammon so that [they could] investigate what had happened.’ ”371 
The state’s intervention had interfered with the defendant’s control 
over the victim. Despite the prosecutor’s subpoena, Amy was not pre-
sent at the trial.372 By the time of sentencing, Amy was again acting 
to protect her husband. She even wrote a letter to the probation de-
partment in support of Hershel.373 
3.   A Principled Framework for Identifying the Relationship 
 The types of relationships that result in “absent accusers” occur in 
several categories of criminal cases. While domestic violence cases of-
ten involve this type of relationship, these relationships occur in 
many other categories of crime as well, such as child and elder abuse, 
corporate crime, and gang-related crime. A close look at these types 
of relationships reveals at least five features that generally charac-
terize such relationships.  
 The first characteristic is a power imbalance between the witness-
declarant and the defendant374 where the defendant holds the domi-
nant position in the relationship. For example, in domestic violence 
cases, the declarant is often a victim who is emotionally or financially 
dependant on the defendant. Child abuse cases present a similar 
type of power imbalance.  
 Second, the relationship is ongoing in nature. The length of the 
past history or the future prospects may vary greatly, but at the time 
of the alleged crime, a relationship has already been established and 
there is an expectation that a relationship will continue into the fu-
ture. Where one or both parties to a relationship anticipate that as-
                                                                                                                     
 368. Id. at 821 (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 17-18). 
 369. Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 32. 
 370. Id.  
 371. Davis, 547 U.S. at 820 (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 34). 
 372. Id. 
 373. See infra note 434 (quoting her handwritten letter). 
 374. In using the term “defendant” in this discussion, I am referring to a larger cate-
gory of people that includes not only a named defendant but also any unidentified perpe-
trators and any other people who have sufficiently close ties to the perpetrator such that 
their interests are aligned with the perpetrator to a degree that causes their relationship 
with the witness-declarant to be similar to that of the perpetrator. 
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pects of the relationship will continue into the future, this may influ-
ence their willingness to cooperate with an investigation and to tes-
tify at trial. 
 Third, the criminal activity relates to or occurs within the rela-
tionship. For example, many drug and property crimes occur in the 
context of gang relationships.375 In corporate relationships, crimes 
may relate to the basic economic enterprise of the institution, as is 
well chronicled in recent episodes involving fraud, antitrust abuses, 
securities wrongdoing, and other kinds of corporate crime.376
 Fourth, the declarant has special knowledge or information that is 
related to or is within the relationship. In many instances this spe-
cial information is unique or essential to prosecute crimes. However, 
the declarant’s perception that there is a confidential aspect to the 
relationship protects the perpetrator’s criminal activity from discov-
ery and evaluation at trial.377  
 Finally, requiring the declarant’s participation in the investiga-
tion and prosecution of the crime interferes with the relationship by 
creating a serious risk of harm to the declarant’s personal welfare in 
the form of physical violence or economic loss. For example, domestic 
violence victims live in serious fear of additional physical or psycho-
logical abuse. This notion of fear extends to other relationships as 
well. In gangs, fear of harm to gang members and their families for 
snitching is pervasive.378 In the business context, fear of job loss or 
economic retaliation for taking positions that are contrary to man-
agement or higher-ups is common.379   
                                                                                                                     
 375. See Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, supra note 354. 
 376. Fanto, supra note 355, at 441 (maintaining that group psychology is a “basic cause 
of the corporate scandals; only it can convincingly account for why so many respected ex-
ecutives, board members, bankers, and trained professionals participated in improper cor-
porate action or turned a blind eye to it.”); see, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, 
THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF 
ENRON (2004). 
 377. Gang members, for example, frequently possess unique information about the 
commission of a crime. Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, supra note 354.  
 378.  Id.  
 379. For example, Sharon Watkins, the lead whistleblower in the Enron scandal, was 
pressured by higher-ups to restate corporate earnings. See generally Tom Hamburger, 
Questioning the Books: Enron Memo Shows Watkins Urged Lay to Restate Earnings, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at A8 (describing Watkins’ efforts to bring problems with Enron to the 
attention of CEO Kenneth Lay). Even before Watkins’ revelations, John Olson, a securities 
analyst with Merrill Lynch, discovered problems in the company, but Merrill Lynch was 
concerned with maintaining its business relationship with Enron and fired him. See 
Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, Merrill Defends Ties to Enron Before Congress—Yet a 
Veteran Analyst’s Perspective on the Firms’ Dealings Shows Pressures  from Major Clients, 
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at C1 (describing Enron’s pressure on Merrill analyst John Ol-
son); see also Fanto, supra note 355, at 439 n.10. 
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B.   Situating the Debate in the Context of the Goals of the Criminal 
Justice System 
 Fundamentally, the law is an expression of values. In implement-
ing a procedural system to enforce laws, the two most salient values 
are truth and fairness. Ideally, the procedural system would effec-
tively reveal the factual truth in all matters. The ability to substan-
tively determine the truth about allegedly illegal conduct impacts the 
system’s legitimacy and validity. However, the value of accurate re-
sults is counterbalanced with the value of fairness in the truth-
seeking process. Justice is a combination of these two values and the 
balance struck between them.  
 But as in all things human, our endeavors are not uniformly suc-
cessful. The meaning of truth itself has been explored and debated by 
philosophers, each with a varying understanding of the concept. The 
ability to determine the factual truth about a past event is imperfect 
given that the fact-finder cannot travel back in time. The fact-finder 
must rely on incomplete and imperfect information in the truth-
seeking process. The burden of proving the past event is therefore 
not to an absolute certainty, but beyond a reasonable doubt.380 Fair-
ness requires the procedure to minimize the negative impact of in-
complete and imperfect information.  
 The goals of truth and fairness frequently overlap. As Parts II and 
III have discussed, the Supreme Court has reconceptualized the Con-
frontation Clause in Crawford and Davis by emphasizing that the 
history of the Clause is rooted in its purpose of procedural fairness. 
The criminal justice system is concerned with procedural fairness be-
cause it helps us avoid false positives—wrongful convictions. How-
ever, it is also well-acknowledged that the system embraces the value 
of getting to the truth as a means to both convict the guilty and to 
protect the innocent. If there were no concerns about practical con-
straints or mitigating factors, a court could decide that all hearsay 
declarants must be confronted at trial. But that requirement may 
lead to unjust results when a witness who is a source of probative 
evidence is unavailable through no fault of the state.381 As the Court 
held over a century ago, general rules of law, “however beneficent in 
their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the 
case.”382  
                                                                                                                     
 380. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970). 
 381. See Raeder, supra note 144, at 15 (advocating a balancing approach to confronta-
tion analysis that would “admit reliable testimonial statements only when the witness’s 
absence was not as a result of negligence or wrongdoing by the government and, para-
phrasing [Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990], there is a particularized showing of 
need for the testimonial evidence based on the facts of the case”).  
 382. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). 
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 The goal of procedural fairness is to create a structure that maxi-
mizes the ability of the fact-finder to determine the truth. If it is im-
possible to guarantee truth in the outcome, then the procedure must 
be constructed in a manner that minimizes the risk of a false out-
come. But unlike truth, fundamental fairness is a judgment that em-
bodies a range of values, and as these values change, it be might be 
expected that the notion of fairness also changes. For example, in the 
past, judicial systems denying African-Americans the ability to serve 
as jurors or denying parties the opportunity to testify in their own 
cases were considered fair by many.383 As we have seen, perspective 
on fairness is influenced, in part, by context.  
 If the scope of the analysis were narrowly limited to two equal 
parties, then fairness, strictly speaking, would require allocation of 
that risk evenly to both sides. In other words, for as many “errone-
ous” acquittals, there should be an equal number of “erroneous” con-
victions. However, American criminal jurisprudence analyzes this 
equation from a different, broader perspective. The Constitution 
guarantees an individual person certain rights in relation to the 
state and in doing so acknowledges a criminal defendant “has at 
stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibil-
ity that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the 
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.”384 Here, 
the goals of pursuing truthful outcomes and using fair procedures are 
frequently in tension with one another and can begin to conflict with 
each other.  
 Emphasis on procedural fairness elevates protecting against false 
positives over protecting against false negatives. There are many ex-
amples of this conflict where courts have highly (some would argue 
excessively) proceduralized criminal investigations and prosecutions 
resulting in factually guilty defendants who are not held responsible 
due to the state’s violations of procedure.385 For example, if a sus-
pect’s truthful confession is taken in violation of the procedures set 
                                                                                                                     
 383. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in 
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 882-901 (1994) (discussing the history of exclu-
sion of African-Americans and women from jury service); George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as 
Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 624-27, 656-76 (1997) (examining witness competency 
rules that prohibited categories of witnesses, including criminal defendants, civil parties, 
and nonwhites, from testifying based on the rationale that such witnesses were most likely 
to lie). 
 384. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. 
 385. This has been an issue of great debate in twentieth century criminal procedure. In 
some ways this is a lesson of the Warren Court, which was focused on protecting the pro-
cedural rights of defendants. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (1997) (critiquing Warren Court view that the Bill of Rights is predominantly 
concerned with protecting minority and individual rights against majorities); Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132-33 (1991) (arguing 
that the Bill of Rights is concerned with empowering, not impeding, popular majorities). 
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forth in Miranda v. Arizona,386 the confession may be suppressed and 
the outcome may be a false acquittal. Over time, the Court has 
struck this balance differently. More recently, the Court has leaned 
more toward the goal of protecting the value of truth. For example, 
since the Warren Court, the Supreme Court has cut back on the 
reach of Miranda in large part because the truth was being ob-
structed.387  
 The fundamental concerns raised in striking a balance between  
truth in factfinding and fairness in procedure are three-fold: the ac-
tual intentional divergence from the truth by the government to ob-
tain a result, the actual but unintentional divergence from the truth 
by the factfinder due to misinterpretation or misleadingly incomplete 
information, and the appearance of divergence from the truth based 
on inequality of power and opportunity to portray or shape the evi-
dence. The prescribed remedy for these problems is confrontation. 
However, the curative ability of physically placing the declarant face-
to-face with the defendant or of challenging the declarant’s state-
ments through cross-examination is based at least in part on pre-
sumptions about psychological aspects of human behavior and pre-
sumptions about the ability of humans as jurors to recognize truth-
telling. It also presumes that a declarant may be more likely to be in-
accurate or untruthful in a setting where the declarant could or 
should realize that statements may be used against the defendant for 
purposes of proving guilt. Further, it presumes that the law enforce-
ment agent may be inaccurate or untruthful in the collection or re-
counting of evidence. 
 Truth, in pursuit of fairness, may often require a broader scope of 
analysis. In this Article, I argue that a court, in analyzing the appli-
cation of the Confrontation Clause, must evaluate from a broader 
perspective whether there is an ongoing emergency during a police 
interrogation. Narrowly limiting the question to whether there is 
risk of imminent physical harm may be an easier standard for courts 
to apply, but such an analysis unacceptably increases the risk of er-
ror in finding the truth.  
 The normative goal of the criminal justice system is to render a 
result as accurate as practicable in the determination of guilt—the 
verdict should reflect the truth. Given that the system requires a cer-
tain minimum level of accuracy to maintain our collective confidence 
                                                                                                                     
 386. 384 U.S. 436, 467-77 (1966). 
 387. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (establishing the booking ex-
ception to Miranda requirements); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing 
the public safety exception); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 222 (1970) (noting that a 
statement taken in violation of Miranda “may, if its trustworthiness satisfies legal stan-
dards, be used for impeachment purposes to attack the credibility of defendant’s trial tes-
timony”).   
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in its fairness, it is necessary to evaluate whether the discussion to 
date has emphasized fairness to the exclusion of the value of truth. 
Errors in the criminal justice system should inure to the benefit of 
the defendant; however, the occurrence of the error cannot be so fre-
quent that the public trust in the system is destroyed.  
 As we have seen,388 certain kinds of relationships give rise to the 
problem of uncooperating witnesses or absent accusers, which makes 
it difficult to prosecute when the witness refuses or is unable to tes-
tify subject to cross-examination. Cases within this category of ab-
sent accusers are problematic because they have a high risk of reach-
ing false outcomes when the state cannot go forward. The resulting 
increased risk of false negatives decreases the overall accuracy of the 
truth-finding function of the criminal justice system and undermines 
public trust in its justice and fairness. In this sense, our system often 
fails to protect those who most need its protection. If a system is not 
effective at achieving its goals of promoting the values of both truth 
and fairness, the public may rationally choose not to rely on or use 
the system. Fewer people relying on or using the system renders the 
system even less effective in regulating society. Courts must pre-
scriptively implement procedures that protect the fairness of the 
process to both sides.  
C.   Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency” 
 By interpreting the Sixth Amendment in light of the goals of the 
criminal justice system, courts could apply Davis in a manner that 
takes into account the relationship circumstances that give rise to 
the problem of false negatives as well as promotes the goals of the 
criminal justice system. Given the ongoing nature of criminal con-
duct in certain relationships, courts must consider the ongoing na-
ture of the relationship in determining whether there is an ongoing 
emergency at the time of the declarant’s responses to police interro-
gation. When a criminal case involves a relationship that is subject to 
the conditions discussed in Part IV.A, courts must widen the lens of 
analysis in deciding whether there is in fact an ongoing emergency.  
 Davis prescribes a multi-step inquiry in directing courts to objec-
tively evaluate the circumstances as they existed during the interro-
gation. In applying Davis, the threshold determination for a court is 
whether the hearsay statement is a result of a police interrogation.389 
If so, then under Davis, the trial court must determine whether there 
was on an ongoing emergency at the time of the police interroga-
                                                                                                                     
 388. See supra Part IV.A. 
 389. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  
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tion.390 Next, the court must analyze the purposes of the interroga-
tion and identify the primary purpose, if any.391 Both of these deter-
minations are predicates to assessing whether the declarant’s state-
ments are testimonial.  
 This Article focuses on a court’s challenges in determining 
whether there is an ongoing emergency at the time of the interroga-
tion, although in doing so it also briefly addresses how a court might 
characterize a police interrogation and identify the primary purpose 
of the interrogation. It is my claim that, where relationships of the 
sort identified above are present, the nature of the relationship is 
relevant to each of these inquiries, thus requiring a court to expand 
its inquiry to consider a range of circumstances in making an admis-
sibility determination. Had the Court properly done this in applying 
the primary purpose test to the facts of Hammon, it may have 
reached a different outcome. 
1.   The Threshold Inquiry: “Police Interrogation” 
 The threshold question is whether the declarant’s statements 
were made in the course of a police interrogation.392 The Court has 
yet to resolve how far the definition of these terms may extend for 
purposes of determining whether a police interrogation occurred.393 
However, both Davis and Crawford indicate that these terms are not 
strictly construed. In Davis, the definition of “police” was indirectly 
expanded beyond law enforcement officers when the Court consid-
ered (without, it said, “deciding the point”) that a 911 operator is in-
cluded in the meaning of police.394 Whether the characterization of 
                                                                                                                     
 390. Id. While some have questioned the utility of using an ongoing emergency as a 
factor in assessing the testimonial nature of a statement, in this Article I have chosen to 
work within the structure set out in Davis. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence 
Cases After Davis: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759, 764-
78 (2007). 
 391. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 
 392. Id.  
 393. The Court has been very cautious in making any bright-line, or even dim-line, 
rules about which characteristics define “police.” The role of the state, either embodied in a 
prosecutor or a police officer, is clearly within the scope of concern the Court is targeting. 
How attenuated the Court will allow this analysis to stretch is unclear. One factor courts 
should examine is how closely the police interrogation resembles, or is acting in place of, a 
prosecutor’s direct examination at trial. 
 394. As the majority in Davis states: 
If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at 
least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 
callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we 
consider their acts to be acts of the police. As in Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), therefore, our holding today makes it unnecessary to 
consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law 
enforcement personnel are “testimonial.” 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2 (2006); see also id. at 837 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Like the Court, I presume the acts of the 911 
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“police” will be extended further to include other agents of the 
state—such as emergency response medical personnel or teachers 
and doctors who are legally mandated to report abuse to law en-
forcement—remains an open question.  
 The definition of “interrogation” was not an issue that was chal-
lenged by the facts of Crawford, because the declarant’s statements 
were made during an in-custody recorded interview by a law en-
forcement officer. However, the Court was explicitly clear about its 
intention to consider other less formal situations as interrogations 
for purposes of Confrontation analysis, saying that it “use[d] the 
term ‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, 
sense.”395 Later, in Davis, the Court even suggested that volunteered 
statements made in the absence of any interrogation could be testi-
monial.396  
2.   Objectively Assessing Whether There is an Ongoing Emergency 
 The Davis Court directs trial courts to conduct an objective analy-
sis.397 It is important to note that the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment are triggered by the initiation of a criminal prosecu-
tion.398 A defendant’s right to confrontation applies in court; thus, the 
constitutionally relevant event is the trial judge’s decision regarding 
the procedure for the admissibility of evidence. The defendant’s 
rights are not violated by the state’s method of evidence collection, 
but by the state’s use of testimonial hearsay evidence at trial without 
demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant and providing the 
opportunity for confrontation.399 Therefore, Davis correctly instructs 
                                                                                                                     
operator to be the acts of the police. Accordingly, I refer to both the operator in Davis and 
the officer in Hammon, and their counterparts in similar cases, collectively as ‘the police.’ ” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 395. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 (“Just as various definitions of ‘testimonial’ exist, one 
can imagine various definitions of ‘interrogation,’ and we need not select among them in 
this case. Sylvia’s recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police 
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition.”).  
 396. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822-23 n.1. 
 397. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 398. According to the Sixth Amendment, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. A violation of the right occurs after the charges have been filed. For example, a 
defendant does not have the right to confront witnesses during grand jury proceedings. In 
most jurisdictions, the target of a grand jury investigation does not have a right to testify 
or be present before the grand jury. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) 
(dictum) (plurality opinion) (no right to counsel in grand jury); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682 (1972) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches after the initiation of adversary ju-
dicial criminal proceedings); 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 128-29 (4th ed. 2006); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 
595 (4th ed. 2000). 
 399. Confrontation is a trial right aimed at preserving the integrity of the trial process. 
As the Davis Court noted, “[t]he Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, 
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courts to engage in ex post reasoning to determine how the Confron-
tation Clause applies to the evidence. A court’s temporal and physical 
distance from the event, as well as its neutral role, enable it to 
evaluate the circumstances from an objective perspective.  
 This objective analysis is from the perspective of a reasonable 
third party who is unrelated to the incident—in other words, the neu-
tral perspective of the court.400 As the Davis Court illustrates, it is 
the “reasonable listener” who recognizes an ongoing emergency.401 
The Court’s findings are not based on the reasonable belief of either 
the declarant or the law enforcement officer.402 Although the Davis 
Court had the opportunity, it did not adopt the formulation in Craw-
ford that described testimonial statements as those “ ‘that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.’ ”403 Nor did it pre-
cisely adopt the broader formulation suggested in Crawford that in-
cluded “ ‘statements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use at a later trial.’ ”404 The issue of the 
testimonial nature of the statement arises only during the subse-
quent litigation, when the declarant and the law enforcement officer 
may perceive a stake in the outcome. The incentives, opportunity, 
and ability of either declarants or law enforcement to intentionally 
manipulate the circumstances of the interrogation and to impact the 
                                                                                                                     
because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial state-
ments which offends that provision. But neither can police conduct govern the Confronta-
tion Clause; testimonial statements are what they are.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6. The 
majority explicitly states that the circumstances which characterize the testimonial nature 
of a declarant’s statement during a police investigation are “essentially beyond police con-
trol.” Id. The remedy of exclusion in the context of the Sixth Amendment is, if anything, 
aimed at the prosecution. It creates a strong incentive for the prosecution to diligently keep 
track of witnesses and to use the court’s power to bring these witnesses into court.  
 400. In his dissent, Justice Thomas criticizes the majority’s “objective” test because of 
its effect in “shift[ing] the ability to control whether a violation occurred from the police 
and prosecutor to the judge.” Id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). In his view, a judge’s determination regarding the objectively dis-
cernable primary purpose of an interrogation may be different from the officer’s actual pur-
pose for conducting the interrogation. Id. For Justice Thomas, the possibility of an inaccu-
rate conclusion renders the test itself useless. What he fails to consider, however, is that 
the focus is not on the officer’s true intention in asking the declarant questions, but rather 
on whether the declarant’s conduct in communicating with the officer is akin to testimony 
in court such that, like in court, the defendant should have the right to confront the wit-
ness. 
 401. Id. at 827 (majority opinion) (“Moreover, any reasonable listener would recognize 
that McCottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was facing an ongoing emergency.”). 
 402. Id. at 832 n.6. 
 403. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410)). 
 404. Id. at 52 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for National Ass’n of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-
9410)).  
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constitutional analysis decrease when the test is objective and no one 
circumstance controls the outcome. 
 Most importantly, in applying Davis, courts must refrain from 
prematurely abbreviating the analysis. It is obviously easier for 
courts to focus on the circumstantial factors that were immediately 
apparent to the police on the scene. But that is not what Davis pre-
scribes. Instead, Davis governs a court’s subsequent evaluation of the 
totality of the circumstances in determining the existence of an ongo-
ing emergency. The circumstances may include factors such as the 
presence or lack of threat to the declarant’s welfare, the location of 
the defendant or others who threaten the declarant’s welfare, the de-
clarant’s ability to escape the threat, and the need for preventive in-
tervention.  
 Some relevant circumstances will not be readily apparent because 
they are simply more difficult to perceive or are hidden. Crimes that 
involve certain relationships are different from sporadic, isolated, 
and discrete stranger crimes.405 In these cases, the court must con-
sider the nature of the relationship between the declarant and others 
potentially involved in the criminal activity.406 A court may be re-
quired to consider past events because of the resulting consequences 
that create a present circumstance of emergency during the interro-
gation. Or, a court may be required to consider the potential future 
consequences of the interrogation that contribute to the emergency of 
the present situation. Because the trial court applies an objective 
standard, it is irrelevant whether the questioning officer was aware, 
                                                                                                                     
 405. Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 23 (“To posit a clean divide between the crime and 
the exigency it creates, and the crime’s aftermath, is to import a model of crime character-
ized by discrete instances of one-time, episodic violence. . . . [T]his conventional paradigm 
is incompatible with the realities of battering.”). 
 406. Professor Tuerkheimer astutely observes: 
The domestic violence victim’s exigency extends beyond what might appear 
to an outside observer, or even to the “reasonable person” unfamiliar with 
the culture of the particular battering relationship, to be the “end” of the 
criminal incident. The exigency the victim experiences requires a narration 
of past events in order to resolve the immediate danger they precipitated. 
In short, the meaning of “exigency” to a victim of domestic violence is dif-
ferent than it is to victims of other types of crime. This reality fatally un-
dermines judicial reasoning predicated on the “crying for help” versus 
“providing information to law enforcement” rubric. 
Id. at 24-25 (footnote omitted).  In State v. Camarena, the court affirmed the admission of a 
response to a callback by a 911 operator after a hung-up call where the victim answered, “ 
‘Yeah, my boyfriend hit me but then he left.’ ” 145 P.3d 267, 269, 276 (Or. App. Ct. 2006). 
Camarena relied on the fact that the defendant could have returned and it 
was likely the victim was seeking assistance against possible renewal of an 
attack, a position that, although reasonable in a domestic violence context, 
extends emergencies until defendants are captured—a conclusion that di-
rectly contradicts the Davis view that “the emergency appears to have 
ended (when Davis drove away from the premises).” 
Raeder, supra note 144, at 13 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 828).  
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or should have been aware, of these circumstances at the time of 
the interrogation.  
3.   Evaluating the Primary Purpose of the Interrogation 
 Police interrogate witnesses for a myriad of purposes, including 
first responder emergency aid, investigation, and evidence collection. 
Recognizing that a police interrogation may often simultaneously 
serve multiple purposes, the Davis Court focused on determining the 
“primary” purpose.407 However, the Court’s decision specifically ac-
knowledged only two significant purposes of police interrogation: 
enabling the police to assist with an ongoing emergency and “estab-
lish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later crimi-
nal prosecution.”408 Nevertheless, the Court’s decision does not pre-
clude recognition of the many other purposes of police interrogation, 
such as enabling the police to give preventive safety advice or ena-
bling the police to identify what service they can provide.  
 Courts approaching this inquiry should apply a multi-step ana-
lytical process to determine the primary purpose of the interrogation. 
First, a court should objectively examine all of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation and identify all of the purposes rea-
sonably served by that interrogation. The circumstances will include 
many factors. One will be the timing of the interrogation.409 Was the 
statement taken near the time of the alleged crime or at some other 
stage of the investigation or prosecution? Location will be another 
factor. Was it at the scene of the crime, or in the police station?  
 Courts may also consider the subjective motivations of the police 
or the declarant. While the court must evaluate objectively, the sub-
jective motivations of the police in questioning a witness or of the de-
clarant in speaking with the police may be relevant circumstances 
that contribute to the overall equation, even though these motiva-
tions are not solely determinative.410 As the Davis Court said, “[The 
                                                                                                                     
 407. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 408. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 409. See id. at 827 (“The difference between the interrogation in Davis and the one in 
Crawford is apparent on the face of things. In Davis, McCottry was speaking about events 
as they were actually happening, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events.’ Sylvia Crawford’s 
interrogation, on the other hand, took place hours after the events she described had oc-
curred.” (internal citation omitted)); see also id. at 832 (“Such exigencies may often mean 
that ‘initial inquiries’ produce nontestimonial statements. But in cases like this one, where 
Amy’s statements were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling of-
ficers immediately to end a threatening situation, the fact that they were given at an al-
leged crime scene and were ‘initial inquiries’ is immaterial.”).  
 410. Contrast the holding of the Indiana Supreme Court, which reasoned “that a ‘tes-
timonial’ statement is one given or taken in significant part for purposes of preserving it 
for potential future use in legal proceedings,” where “the motivations of the questioner and 
declarant are the central concerns.” Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456-57 (Ind. 2005). 
As the Indiana Supreme Court stated: 
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police] saying that an emergency exists cannot make it be so.”411 The 
content of the interrogation itself should be considered. While the fo-
cus is on the declarant’s statements,412 the officer’s questioning is one 
circumstance to consider in evaluating the testimonial nature of the 
declarant’s statements. In assessing the risk of present or future 
danger, the officer may ask questions that are potentially related to 
criminal activity. The content of the questions and responses may 
provide the police with necessary information that “enable[s] police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”413 
 Next, the court should objectively evaluate the identified purposes 
and apportion weight to them according to their relative importance 
under the circumstances. If the proportional importance of one pur-
pose equals or exceeds that of the others, then the court should find 
that purpose to be the primary purpose of the interrogation.414 As 
Justice Thomas astutely observed in his dissent, an objective deter-
mination of the primary purpose of an interrogation is perhaps more 
accurately described as an ex post determination of “the function 
served by the interrogation.”415 
                                                                                                                     
In evaluating whether a statement is for purposes of future legal utility, 
the motive of the questioner, more than that of the declarant, is determi-
native, but if either is principally motivated by a desire to preserve the 
statement it is sufficient to render the statement “testimonial.” If the 
statement is taken pursuant to established procedures, either the subjec-
tive motivation of the individual taking the statement or the objectively 
evaluated purpose of the procedure is sufficient. 
Id. at 456. The Indiana court emphasized its willingness to consider the subjective intent 
of either the declarant or the officer by stating “we believe that whether a statement from 
a declarant to a police officer is testimonial will hinge upon the intent of the declarant in 
making the statement and the purpose for which the police officer elicited the statement.” 
Id. at 457. Despite the clear reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court, both parties aban-
doned this subjective analysis in their briefs and argument to the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
Brief of Petitioner at 33, Davis, 547 U.S. 813  (No. 05-5705); Brief of Respondent at 31, 
Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-5705). 
 411. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6 (“While prosecutors may hope that inculpatory ‘nontes-
timonial’ evidence is gathered, this is essentially beyond police control.”).  
 412. See id. at 823 n.1 (“[I]t is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the 
interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”). 
 413. Id. at 822.  
 414. But see, e.g., id. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (“In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime, . . 
. the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to re-
spond to the emergency situation and to gather evidence. . . . Assigning one of these two 
“largely unverifiable motives” primacy requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that 
will rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible.” (internal citations omitted)). Pro-
fessor Tuerkheimer discusses how the interrogation purposes may be intertwined. Assert-
ing that Davis’s dichotomy between “crying for help” and “providing information” for inves-
tigatory purposes is false in domestic violence cases, Professor Tuerkheimer argues that 
abuse victims face ongoing threats that require them to provide information about past 
violence to prevent imminent harm. Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
 415. Davis, 547 U.S. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). 
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4.   Determining Whether the Statement is Testimonial 
 After the court has addressed the issues of ongoing emergency 
and primary purpose of the interrogation, the court can use these two 
determinations to assess whether the declarant’s statement is testi-
monial. Davis lays out the basic parameters of the range of possibili-
ties. On one end, Davis decided that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial 
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”416 On the 
other end, Davis decided that statements “are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crimi-
nal prosecution.”417 
 In between these two situations, the Court left open a wide area 
of undecided middle ground. For example, if there is an ongoing 
emergency but the primary purpose of the interrogation is anything 
other than to enable police assistance to meet that ongoing emer-
gency, then the statement may or may not be testimonial. In fact, 
Davis only characterizes as testimonial those statements which are 
made when “there is no such ongoing emergency.”418  
 The Court’s apparent confinement of testimonial statements to 
those taken when there is no ongoing emergency may reflect an un-
certainty over which “evil” the Confrontation Clause is intended to 
avoid. If prosecutorial abuse were the main target of the Confronta-
tion Clause, then even statements taken during an ongoing emer-
gency when “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to [a] later criminal prose-
cution”419 would likely be testimonial. But the Court did not address 
this situation. In fact, the Court reinforced the importance of the 
emergency ending before statements might “ ‘evolve into testimonial 
statements.’ ”420 Similarly, the Court did not decide whether a state-
                                                                                                                     
 416. Id. at 822 (majority opinion). 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id.  
 419. Id.  
 420. Id. at 828 (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005)). The 
Court reasoned: 
This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation to 
determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Su-
preme Court put it, “evolve into testimonial statements,” once that purpose 
has been achieved. In this case, for example, after the operator gained the 
information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency 
appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises). The 
operator then told McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of 
questions. It could readily be maintained that, from that point on, 
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ment would be testimonial when there is no ongoing emergency and 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is anything other than to es-
tablish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crimi-
nal prosecution.  
5.   Incorporating the Relationship into the Analysis 
 Applying this approach to the facts of Hammon illustrates how a 
broader perspective—one that considers the relationship at each step 
of the analysis—directs courts to more thoroughly consider all the 
relevant circumstances. There are many relevant circumstances that 
the Court should have considered in its evaluation of whether there 
was an ongoing emergency when Amy Hammon gave her oral state-
ment to the police. The initial circumstances observed by the officers 
were that “Amy told them that things were fine,”421 and they did not 
hear any “arguments or crashing” or see anyone “throw or break any-
thing.”422 Because of these few circumstances, the Court determined 
that “[t]here was no emergency in progress.”423 
 The Court failed to provide a meaningful determination regard-
ing the existence of an ongoing emergency in Hammon because the 
scope of circumstances it considered was too limited. For example, 
the location and condition of the scene provided evidence of recent vi-
olence. The officers observed recently broken items in the home. More 
importantly, the defendant was still present in the home with Amy. 
The home was presumably the primary residence for both. In the 
home, Amy was still within the reach of the defendant who had the 
capacity to render further harm to her. Arguably, Amy may have 
been physically free to  leave; she was standing on the porch when 
the police arrived. However, there was evidence that Herschel was 
trying to prevent her from calling for help or leaving. He broke the 
                                                                                                                     
McCottry’s statements were testimonial, not unlike the “structured police 
questioning” that occurred in Crawford. 
Id. at 828-29 (citations omitted). 
 421. Id. at 830 (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 14). 
 422. Id. at 829 (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 25). 
 423. Id. at 829-30. But see id. at 841 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). In Justice Thomas’s view: 
[T]he fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating Mr. Hammon’s 
past conduct does not foreclose the possibility that the primary purpose of 
his inquiry was to assess whether Mr. Hammon constituted a continuing 
danger to his wife, requiring further police presence or action. It is hardly 
remarkable that Hammon did not act abusively towards his wife in the 
presence of the officers, and his good judgment to refrain from criminal be-
havior in the presence of police sheds little, if any, light on whether his vio-
lence would have resumed had the police left without further questioning, 
transforming what the Court dismisses as “past conduct” back into an “on-
going emergency.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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phone and “ ‘[t]ore up [Amy’s] van where [she] couldn’t leave 
the house.’ ”424  
 In a situation where police respond to a call and the alleged bat-
terer and victim are located within a shared residence, a court should 
objectively assess whether there is a continuing threat of harm and 
an inability to escape the threat. Studies have shown that the most 
dangerous time for a victim of domestic violence is when she leaves 
the relationship.425 Police may need to gather information from the 
victim to determine whether there is probable cause to make an ar-
rest so they are able to resolve the present emergency by removing 
the threat from the residence. In appropriate cases, a court should 
consider this statistical data as a circumstance indicating an ongo-
ing emergency. 
 The Court should also have considered the time of day in deter-
mining whether there was an ongoing emergency. Emergencies cer-
tainly may occur at any time of day or night.426 However, the exi-
gency of a violent situation may be intensified by the fact that it oc-
curred at night, when there are fewer safe places for escape and 
there is a heightened need for shelter. The Hammon incident oc-
curred around 11:00 p.m.427   
 In addition to the circumstances that were observed at the time of 
the statements, a court should consider other external circumstances 
that factor into the existence of an emergency. For example, in 
Hammon, Herschel was on probation for battery of his daughter.428 A 
court could reasonably infer that Amy was aware of this battery and 
therefore knew that the defendant was willing to use violence against 
family members. Not only was Hershel responsible for prior violence 
to his family, he was also on probation for that incident. Amy, just 
having been the object of Herschel’s violence, was in a situation 
where the circumstances indicated that Herschel was undeterred 
from using physical violence even after the criminal justice system 
                                                                                                                     
 424. Id. at 820 (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 2). 
 425.  “Up to seventy-five percent of reported domestic assaults may occur after the se-
paration of the batterer and his wife.” Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domes-
tic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1610 (1993). Many “have noted that the batterer’s 
level of violence escalates after a victim has gained her independance.” Id. Further studies 
have shown that victims of domestic violence “are most likely to be murdered when they 
attempt to leave . . . or report abuse.” Id. at 1610-11; see also Desmond Ellis, Post-
Separation Woman Abuse: The Contribution of Lawyers as “Barracudas,” “Advocates,” and 
“Counsellors,” 10 INTL. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 403 (1987); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images 
of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1. (1991). 
 426. For example, the Davis incident occurred at around noon. Davis Appendix, supra 
note 181, at 8. 
 427. In Hammon, the prosecuting attorney “verified police were called at 10:52 p.m. . . . 
by a third party calling 911.” Laurie Kiefaber, Miami County Case to Be Heard by U.S. Su-
preme Court, PERU TRIB., Nov. 14, 2005. The officers arrived at the Hammon home at 
10:55 p.m. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005).  
 428. Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 58. 
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had intervened and imposed consequences for it. A reasonable person 
in that situation would not feel or be safe just because the police were 
temporarily intervening. Objectively, the defendant’s probationary 
status is a circumstance the court should have considered as relevant 
to the potential danger that was present in the Hammon household 
at the time the declarant was speaking with the officer. Furthermore, 
the fight between Amy and Herschel was due to a disagreement over 
their daughter.429  
 Most important, the court should examine the declarant’s rela-
tionship with the defendant. Amy and Herschel Hammon’s relation-
ship possessed all five features of the type of relationship for which a 
court should closely consider the relationship dynamics and their im-
pact on the existence of an ongoing emergency. First, there appears 
to be a power imbalance between the witness-declarant and the de-
fendant where the defendant holds the dominant position. Amy ap-
peared timid when the officers observed her, and she initially lied to 
protect Herschel. She appeared intimidated when Herschel tried to 
intervene while she was giving her statement to the officer.430  
 Second, Amy and Herschel had an ongoing relationship. They 
were married and had a child together. Amy apparently loved and 
needed Herschel.431 In the absence of evidence that they were in the 
process of ending the relationship, it is reasonable to infer that there 
was an expectation that the relationship would continue into the fu-
ture. Third, the criminal activity related to or occurred within the re-
lationship. On two occasions known to the court, Herschel was vio-
lent within the relationship. Previously, Hershel battered their 
daughter. Presently, Herschel was accused of battering Amy in their 
home in an argument about their daughter. Fourth, Amy had special 
knowledge or information that was related to or was within the rela-
tionship. Amy was in a position where she was the only known wit-
ness to the battery. Because they were married and had children to-
gether, it is reasonable to infer that she possessed all the information 
inherent in that type of family relationship.  
 Finally, the requirements of the declarant’s participation in the 
investigation and prosecution of the crime interfere with the rela-
tionship by creating a serious risk of harm to the declarant’s personal 
                                                                                                                     
 429. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 820. Amy wrote in her affidavit that Herschel “ ‘[a]ttacked 
my daughter.’ ” Id. (quoting Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 2). The officer testified 
that Amy told him “ ‘[t]hat [Herschel] became irrate [sic] over the fact of their daughter go-
ing to a boyfriend’s house.’ ” Id. (citing Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 17-18).  
 430. “Hershel ‘became angry when [the officer] insisted that [he] stay separated from 
Mrs. Hammon so that [the officers could] investigate what had happened.’ ” Id. (quoting 
Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 34). 
 431. While not evidence at the pretrial stage, Amy’s letter to the probation department 
for sentencing indicated her feelings for Herschel and her desire to stay together with him. 
See infra note 434. 
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welfare through physical violence or economic loss. As the sole wit-
ness, Amy’s evidence was essential to intervention by the state be-
cause the case would not have sufficient evidence without her state-
ments or testimony. While Amy told the officer what happened, Her-
schel continued to threaten her by trying at least twice to enter the 
living room.432 Her response—“becom[ing] quiet, almost afraid to 
speak at that time”433—demonstrated how her participation inter-
fered with the relationship, which created a serious risk of harm. 
Furthermore, Amy needed Herschel to continue working in order to 
help the family financially and to help with their children.434 The pos-
sibility of Herschel being incarcerated created a serious risk of eco-
nomic loss and harm to Amy and her children.  
 Considering this nonexclusive list of factors, a court could rea-
sonably find that an ongoing emergency existed at the time of Amy’s 
statements to the police. Only when the police intervened by arrest-
ing Herschel and removing him from the home were they able to as-
sist in abating the emergency threat of imminent harm to Amy.  
 While there may be many reasons why a declarant may be unable 
or unwilling to participate in the trial, one reason in cases involving 
relationships, as discussed above, is to avoid the negative conse-
quences of the ongoing emergency.435 In fact, in many cases, the de-
clarant’s later inability or unwillingness to testify at trial can be in-
direct evidence of the ongoing emergency: the declarant is trying to 
avoid the negative consequences of making the statement to the po-
lice. The emergency may still be ongoing at the time of trial and the 
declarant’s unavailability is a direct result of that emergency. The 
risk of serious harm to welfare may be present from the time of the 
hearsay statement to the moment of trial. Analyzing the testimonial 
nature of a hearsay statement in this manner both recognizes the 
complex and problematic dynamics of cases involving certain rela-
tionships and respects the ultimate values of the criminal justice sys-
tem.  
                                                                                                                     
 432. Hammon Appendix, supra note 24, at 32.  
 433. Id.  
 434. As her handwritten letter in the Hammon record stated:  
As for sentencing, I would like my husband, Hershel Hammon to receive 
counceling [sic] and go to AA, because it has helped him in the past. I 
would like to see him put on probation to ensure that it happens and where 
he can still work to help financially and be here to help with our children. I 
also need his help around the house for we’re remodeling the house and 
plan to sell it so we can move out of town. I love my husband, I just want to 
see him stop drinking. I do not feel threatened by his presence. 
Id. at 65.  
 435. In Davis, the Court recognized that domestic violence cases were “notoriously sus-
ceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at tri-
al.” 547 U.S. at 832-33. 
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D.   Concerns with a More Pragmatic Approach to Assessing the 
Ongoing Emergency 
 This Article has highlighted some of the unique institutional prob-
lems that criminal cases involving certain relationships present and 
has proposed a solution that judges can apply. While, as Professor 
Lininger has argued, some of these issues could be addressed by 
state legislatures,436 even absent legislation courts have at their dis-
posal a more flexible approach that is able to do justice in individual 
cases while also implementing the constitutional values of the new 
Confrontation Clause regime. Inevitably, however, there are some 
potential objections to the approach I advocate.  
 To begin, any legal standard other than a bright-line rule faces 
the recurring issues of where to draw the line and the resulting lack 
of predictability. For example, Justice Thomas in his dissent criti-
cized the primary purpose test as not workable for all hearsay state-
ments that may implicate the Confrontation Clause; thus the results 
are unpredictable.437 Inevitably, courts will continue to face chal-
lenges in deciding when the analysis I propose in this Article should 
be applied and how the parameters should be defined.   
 Predictability and consistency of results are important factors in 
developing a fair and just system. Assuredly, bright-line standards 
are efficient and useful when they produce just results. However, the 
majority rejected the bright-line rule Justice Thomas urged the 
Court to adopt.438 While this bright-line rule may be easier to admin-
ister because factors of formality are more overtly observable than 
circumstances indicating the purpose of an interrogation, it is flawed 
in other ways. The majority struck back at Thomas’s dissent, by simi-
larly criticizing the “workability” of his approach and pointing out 
that even the bright-line formality test must have exceptions to reach 
a just result. These exceptions inevitably diminish the test’s predict-
ability.439 Ultimately the majority acknowledged that designing an 
                                                                                                                     
 436. Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 
275 (2006) (recommending “that states promptly seize the opportunity to legislate confron-
tation policy”). 
 437. See supra Part III.C. 
 438. Beginning in White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas has consistently proposed that 
“statements regulated by the Confrontation Clause must include ‘extrajudicial statements . 
. . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior tes-
timony, or confessions.’ ” Davis, 547 U.S. at 836 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added)). Police would 
have great incentive to avoid taking a statement under circumstances with markers of 
formality. This built-in incentive does not promote quality investigation or evidence pres-
ervation. The consequence is detrimental to both the state and the defendant and would 
potentially increase the inaccuracy of the entire system. 
 439. Id. at 830-31 n.5 (majority opinion). The majority also defended its approach by 
modestly defining its goal as simply resolving the cases before it and claiming that the 
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exhaustive classification system for testimonial statements proves 
problematic, for there is always a hypothetical scenario where a gen-
eralized standard of analysis could result in injustice or incongruity 
with the purpose of the Clause. Similarly, the flexibility of my ap-
proach provides for a more comprehensive analysis of an individual 
case which ideally leads to a more just result. 
 Furthermore, there is the concern that this approach will increase 
the risk of false positives—that the lack of cross-examination of these 
declarants will result in the conviction of more innocent defendants. 
However, the criminal justice system has many other protections in 
place that guard against this outcome.440 Before Crawford dramati-
cally revised the confrontation analysis, our system had a risk of 
false outcomes under Ohio v. Roberts and its progeny that was ac-
cepted for almost twenty-five years. One indication that the previous 
level of risk is still acceptable may be found in Wharton v. Bockting, 
the Court’s recent decision holding that Crawford does not apply ret-
roactively.441 In Bockting, the Court held that Crawford embodied a 
new rule,442 but the rule was not “a ‘watershed rul[e] of criminal pro-
cedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the 
criminal proceeding.”443 The potential increase of false positives may 
be a true risk, but it should not be overemphasized. The risk of false 
positives must also be considered in the context of the risk of false 
negatives to fairly evaluate the total impact. There is always a poten-
tial risk of false outcomes, but one must evaluate the balance fairly 
in pursuing the goal of increasing overall accuracy. This approach 
promotes decisions based on values that will encourage courts to find 
an acceptable balance in the risks.  
 Another objection is that the focus in this category of cases should 
be on forfeiture rather than a more complex and nuanced analysis of 
identification of testimonial statements. Both approaches potentially 
result in admitting hearsay evidence without the confrontation of the 
declarant’s trial testimony. However, forfeiture is perhaps too nar-
rowly focused on the fault of the defendant. The approach in this Ar-
ticle differs in that it is not focused exclusively on the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                     
primary purpose test achieves that goal. Id. Justice Thomas conceded that his formality 
test is vulnerable to bad faith manipulation and creates an exception for “technically in-
formal statements when used to evade the formalized process.” Id. at 838 (Thomas, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 440.  For example, defendants retain all the other Sixth Amendment trial rights as 
well as due process rights generally. 
 441. Wharton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
 442. Id. at 1181 (“ ‘A new rule is defined as ‘a rule that . . . was not ‘dictated by prece-
dent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
 443. Id. at 1180 (“A new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) 
the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a  ‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicat-
ing the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (citations and internal quotations omitted)).  
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wrongdoing. Instead, it more broadly incorporates key factors about 
the dynamics of the relationship.  
 Finally, some may object based on constitutional methodology. It 
might be claimed that this proposal is inconsistent with the text of 
the Sixth Amendment. However, the goal of this Article has been to 
apply a functional and pragmatic rather than textualist or originalist 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.444 Ultimately, the Sixth 
Amendment will be evaluated by its ability to promote truth and 
fairness. The Sixth Amendment allows this application when inter-
preted, not in isolation, but in view of the goals of the criminal justice 
system. This approach to interpreting the Confrontation Clause is 
consistent with both textualist approaches that recognize truth-
seeking goals445 and the functionalist approach to constitutional in-
terpretation446 that holds sway with most judges and practitioners.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Crawford is a groundbreaking Confrontation Clause decision, but 
like many new legal approaches, it leads lower court judges down an 
unsettled path that is entangled in the thicket of many novel issues, 
such as how to determine when statements are “testimonial.” In Da-
vis, the Court cleared up some of Crawford’s testimonial thicket, but 
its guidance to lower court judges remains incomplete. It is particu-
larly disappointing that the Court had an opportunity to specifically 
address how courts should approach cases with complex relation-
ships between witness-declarants and defendants. Such circum-
stances are typical in domestic violence cases, including the two 
cases before the Court, as well as in other relationships in which 
criminal activities occur, such as child abuse, gangs, and corpo-
rate crimes.  
 As this Article has argued, the institutional and sociological dy-
namics of some relationships frequently impose an impediment to a 
declarant-witness testifying at trial. Davis leaves much of the analy-
                                                                                                                     
 444. Even Justice Scalia apparently abandoned Crawford’s strict originalist approach 
when he noted in Davis that “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms 
against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 
831 n.5. 
 445. See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 385, at 1132-33; Akhil 
Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1045 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 641 (1996). 
 446. Cf. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 167 (2001) (noting inevitable limits of formal-
ism); Frank O. Bowman, III, Function over Formalism: A Provisional Theory of the Consti-
tutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 1 (2004) (decrying formalism 
in constitutional criminal procedure); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches 
to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 
(1987) (defending functionalism).   
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sis to be worked out case-by-case as trial court judges make ad hoc 
determinations of admissibility in such relationships. For example, 
despite Davis, lower court judges continue to face challenges in de-
termining whether there is an ongoing emergency at the time of the 
interrogation—an important predicate inquiry to an admissibility de-
termination where there is a relationship between the declarant-
witness and the defendant. While more open-ended and pragmatic, 
however, this inquiry should not be without some guiding principles. 
In this Article, I have drawn from Crawford and Davis to provide a 
set of pragmatic considerations that might allow lower courts to 
strike a balance between the goals of the criminal justice system and 
the complexities presented by certain relationships. Where ongoing 
relationships present problematic characteristics that make the trial 
availability of the witness-declarant unlikely, the nature of the rela-
tionship is relevant, and a court must expand its inquiry to consider 




































       
       
